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Abstract
We study market externalities of unemployment insurance (UI) benefits, i.e. the effect
of variations in UI benefits on the job finding probability of unemployed workers conditional
on any given individual job search strategy. We show how market externalities of UI can be
identified in a quasi-experimental setting by estimating how UI benefit generosity granted
to eligible workers affects job search outcomes of non-eligible workers in the same labor
market. We implement this strategy and present evidence of the existence of significant
market externalities using the Regional Extension Benefit Program (REBP) in Austria. This
program extended the potential duration of UI benefits to four years for a large group of
eligible workers in selected (REBP) regions of Austria. We find that non-eligible workers in
REBP regions have higher job finding rates, lower unemployment durations, and a lower risk
of long-term unemployment. These effects are the largest when the intensity of the program
reaches its highest level, then decrease and eventually disappear as the program is scaled
down and finally abolished. Our evidence sheds new light on the relevance of alternative
assumptions on technology and wage setting in equilibrium search and matching models.
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1 Introduction
The probability that an unemployed individual finds a job depends on her job search strategy
and on labor market conditions determining how easy (or difficult) it is to be matched to a
potential employer.1 Changes in unemployment insurance (UI) policies affect the search strategy
of unemployed workers which in turn affects their job search outcomes. This is the micro effect
of UI. Changes in UI policies also affect equilibrium labor market conditions which in turn will
affect the job finding probability for any given search strategy. We call this second effect market
externalities of UI.
The micro effect can be identified by comparing two individuals with different levels of UI
generosity in the same labor market. A large number of well-identified estimates of the micro
effect have shown that more generous UI benefits tend to increase unemployment duration.2 In
contrast, evidence on market externalities is scarce. The aim of this paper is to bridge this gap.
Market externalities of UI are important for at least two reasons. First, the overall effect
of variations in UI on search outcomes, the macro effect, consists of both the micro effect and
market externalities. Studies comparing individuals subject to differential UI benefit generosity
within the same labor market identify the micro effect. These studies cannot shed light on the
true effect of UI if externalities are important. Second, market externalities have first order
welfare effects, as shown in Landais et al. [2010]. This implies that the sign and magnitude of
market externalities is critical to determine the optimal level of UI.
There is no theoretical consensus on the sign and magnitude of market externalities of UI.
And it is empirically challenging to estimate market externalities because general equilibrium
effects are typically hard to identify. Recent papers have tried to directly estimate equilibrium
effects of active labor market policies such as randomized programs of counselling for job seekers
without reaching a clear consensus (Blundell et al. [2004], Ferracci et al. [2010], Gautier et
al. [2012]).3 More recently, Cre´pon et al. [2013] analyze a job search assistance program for
young educated unemployed in France with two levels of randomization: the share of treated
was randomly assigned across labor markets, and within each labor market individual treatment
was also randomized. They find evidence of significant displacement effects for unemployed men
who were not in the program. But take-up of the training program was low (35%) and many
job seekers were already employed at the time of the experiment, substantially limiting the
statistical power to detect displacement effects.
Contrary to UI, active labor market programs do not directly affect outside options of work-
1Setting a job search strategy involves decisions such as: how hard to search, what jobs to search for, how to
set one’s reservation wage, etc. Labor market conditions depend on the number of job searchers (and the intensity
with which they search), on the number of available jobs, and on the extent to which labor market frictions inhibit
immediate matching of job searchers to open vacancies.
2See for instance Krueger and Meyer [2002] for a survey of early studies. More recent studies include Landais
[2013] for the US, Schmieder et al. [2012b] for Germany or Lalive and Zweimu¨ller [2004a,b] for Austria.
3Blundell et al. [2004] study the effect of a counselling program for young unemployed in the UK and find little
evidence of displacement effects. Ferracci et al. [2010] study a program for young employed workers in France and
find that the direct effect of the program is smaller in labor markets where a larger fraction of the labor force is
treated. Gautier et al. [2012] analyze a randomized job search assistance program organized in 2005 in two Danish
counties. Comparing control individuals in experimental counties to job seekers in some similar non-participating
counties, their results suggest the presence of substantial negative spillovers.
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ers in the wage bargaining process, and miss a potentially important element of equilibrium
adjustments through wages. Active labor market programs are therefore only partially informa-
tive about the market externalities of UI. We are aware of only one paper that studies market
externalities of UI. Levine [1993] finds that increases in the replacement rate of UI decreases
unemployment duration among the unemployed who are ineligible for UI. Hagedorn et al. [2013]
estimate a macro elasticity of unemployment with respect to UI variations for the U.S. by com-
paring counties on the border of states with different potential benefit duration. Our estimates
are compatible with the macro elasticity they find. Our results complement their findings in
suggesting that the micro effect is larger than the macro effect, due to the existence of significant
market externalities.
In this paper we shed new light on market externalities of UI. First, we show how market
externalities can be identified in a quasi-experimental setting by looking at the effect of a UI
benefit variation in a given labor market on job search outcomes of workers who are not eligible
to the UI benefit variation but who search in the same labor market. We define the relevant
labor market as the place where workers are competing for the same vacancies, and propose a
new method to determine the scope of a labor market using vacancy data. Second, we implement
this strategy and offer evidence of the existence of market externalities of UI benefit extensions
using the Regional Extension Benefit Program (REBP) in Austria. This program extended
unemployment benefits drastically for a large subset of workers in selected regions of Austria
from June 1988 until August 1993. We focus on unemployed workers in REBP regions who
are similar to the eligible unemployed, compete for the same vacancies, but are not eligible
for REBP because they fail to meet the eligibility requirements of the REBP program. Using
a difference-in-difference identification strategy, we compare these non-eligible unemployed to
similar non-eligible unemployed in non-REBP regions to identify the effect of REBP on duration
of job search of non-eligible unemployed in treated markets.
The REBP is a compelling empirical setting to study market externalities of UI. First,
treated workers received an extra three years of covered unemployment with an unchanged
benefit level. This large UI extension generated a strong increase in unemployment duration
of treated workers thereby manipulating equilibrium labor market conditions [Lalive, 2008].
Second, REBP was enacted only in a subset of regions (28 of about 100 regions) and, within
treated regions, 90% of workers above 50 years old were eligible to the program. This allows us
to study how ineligible job seekers in REBP regions compare to similar workers in non-REBP
regions. While the choice of treated regions and workers is partially endogenous, we use specific
features of the REBP program to build a credible identification strategy. Finally, administrative
data on the universe of unemployment spells is available in Austria since the 1980s. By matching
data from the unemployment register with social security data on the universe of employment
spells in Austria since 1949, we can determine eligibility status for the REBP program along
all eligibility dimensions. Our data also enable us to look at many different outcomes, from
unemployment and non-employment durations, to reemployment characteristics and wages. As
the data cover sufficiently long periods before and after the REBP program, we are able to study
whether externalities appear during the program and whether they disappear after the program
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is repealed.
Our results demonstrate the presence of sizable market externalities of UI. REBP induced
a 2 to 4 weeks decrease in the average unemployment duration of all non-eligible workers aged
46 to 54 compared to similar workers from non REBP regions. For non-eligible workers aged
50 to 54, who are competing for similar vacancies as treated workers, unemployment duration
decreases by 6 to 8 weeks. These effects are the largest when the program intensity reaches
its highest level, then decrease and disappear as the program is scaled down and finally in-
terrupted. In our robustness analysis, we address the two main potential confounders for our
results. First, we provide evidence that our results are unlikely to be driven by region-specific
shocks contemporaneous with the REBP program. Second, we show that our results are unlikely
to be confounded by selection, i.e. a change in unobserved characteristics of non-eligible workers
contemporaneous with the REBP program. We also show evidence that the magnitude of the
externalities on non-eligible workers increases with the intensity of the REBP treatment across
local labor markets. We finally identify the presence of geographical spillovers of the REBP
program on non-REBP regions that have labor markets that are highly integrated to REBP
regions.
Our empirical findings have important policy implications. First, the presence of significant
market externalities implies that the micro and the macro effect of UI extensions will differ.
Our estimates imply a significant wedge between the micro (em) and the macro (eM ) effect of
UI extensions on the job finding rate of workers in labor markets that were treated by REBP:
W = 1− eM/em ≈ .21. In the REBP setting, a segment only of the labor force was treated, and
substitution opportunities to treated workers were potentially available in non-treated labor
markets. We show that our estimated wedge is therefore a lower bound on the magnitude
of the wedge when the whole labor force is treated by a change in UI benefits. Second, our
results bear important implications for the design of optimal UI policies. Our results imply that
more generous UI benefits increase labor market tightness and the job finding rate per unit of
search effort. As a consequence, the optimal level of UI will be larger than suggested by the
partial equilibrium Baily-Chetty formula (Chetty [2006]), as explained in Landais et al. [2010].
This means that temporary extensions enacted in reaction to business cycles downturns are less
socially costly than what a partial equilibrium representation would suggest.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our theoretical frame-
work, explains the concept of market externalities and how they can be identified. Section 3
presents the institutional background of the REBP program. Section 4 presents the data and our
empirical strategy. It also shows how we can use vacancy data to identify groups of non-treated
workers competing with treated workers for jobs in the same labor market. Section 5 presents
the results as well as our robustness and heterogeneity analysis. Section 6 draws welfare and
policy implications.
3
2 Market externalities of UI and their identification
The probability that an individual finds a job depends on how hard that individual searches for
a job and/or on how selective she is in her acceptance decisions. It also depends on the labor
market conditions that determine how easy it is to locate jobs or to be matched to a potential
employer. These two forces are usually represented in equilibrium search and matching models
by the stylized decomposition: hi = ei · f(θ). h is the hazard rate out of unemployment. ei
captures the search effort / selectiveness component. θ is the ratio of job vacancies to total
search effort, and represents the tightness of the labor market. f(θ) therefore captures the effect
of labor market conditions on the job finding probability per unit of effort.4 If there are no job
vacancies created by employers, then f(θ) = 0 and no amount of search effort by an unemployed
worker would yield a positive probability of obtaining a job.
Changes in unemployment benefit policies affect the search intensity and selectiveness of
unemployed workers. We call this effect the micro effect of UI. It can be identified by comparing
two individuals with different levels of UI generosity in the same labor market. However, changes
in UI generosity also affect labor market conditions and the job finding rate per unit of search
effort. We call this second effect market externalities. It stems from equilibrium adjustments in
labor market tightness θ in response to a change in UI generosity. The overall effect on the job
finding rate of a change in UI, the macro effect of UI, is therefore the sum of the micro effect
and market externalities.
There are at least two reasons why we care about identifying the presence of market exter-
nalities of UI. First, when the generosity of UI varies, for instance due to UI benefit extensions
such as the recent EUC program in the US, the total effect on unemployment will be the sum
of the micro effect and of market externalities. Studies comparing individuals with different UI
benefits within the same labor market will typically identify only the micro effect, and cannot
shed light on the true effect of such UI extensions. Second, as shown in Landais et al. [2010],
market externalities have first order welfare effects whenever the Hosios condition is not met.
The sign and magnitude of market externalities is therefore critical to determine the optimal
level of UI.
As explained in Landais et al. [2010], using the framework developed by Michaillat [2012],
the sign and magnitude of market externalities depends on two forces: the rat race effect and
the wage effect. Appendix A gives a detailed theoretical presentation of the framework, derives
the formula for market externalities and the decomposition into the rat race effect and the wage
effect.
The rat race effect arises when labor demand is not perfectly elastic and does not fully adjust
to variations in search effort of unemployed workers, which will be the case when technology
exhibits diminishing returns to labor.5 Intuitively, in the extreme case when there is a fixed
number of jobs, an increase in an individual’s search effort will increase her probability of finding
4Note that f, f ′ > 0, f ′′ < 0 characterizes the matching process in a labor market with frictions.
5Diminishing returns is a sufficient but not a necessary condition for the presence of a downward sloping labor
demand. Landais et al. [2010] show for instance that an “aggregate demand model” with a quantity equation for
money and nominal wage rigidities will feature a downward sloping labor demand even with linear technology.
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a job. However, this must come at the expense of the probability of all other unemployed to find
a job as the total number of jobs remains unchanged. Hence an increase in UI generosity, by
decreasing aggregate search effort, increases the probability of finding a job per unit of search
effort f(θ). The rat race effect creates a positive market externality.
The wage effect arises when wages are determined through a bargaining process. An increase
in UI generosity improves workers’ outside option and tend to increase wages. This decreases
the return from opening vacancies for firms, leading to a decrease in labor demand. Thus the
wage effect creates a negative market externality.
The overall effect of a change in UI benefits on equilibrium labor market tightness will
therefore depend on the relative magnitude of these two effects. When wages do not react to a
particular policy, the rat race effect will be the only driver of labor market tightness adjustments
to the policy. Studies estimating spillover effects of active labor market or training programs
such as Cre´pon et al. [2013] therefore tend to capture a pure rat race effect as these training
programs are unlikely to affect bargained wages.
To identify market externalities, our strategy compares two groups of workers who are search-
ing for jobs in the same labor market. The first group is “treated” and experiences an exogenous
change of UI generosity, while the second group is not treated and does not experience any change
in UI benefits. The individual search effort of treated workers will respond, changing their job
finding probability. This change in search effort will also affect equilibrium labor market tight-
ness and therefore the job finding probability per unit of search effort, creating labor market
externalities. The change in the job finding probability of non-treated workers will capture these
market externalities.
In appendix A.2, we show under which conditions a change in the job finding probability of
non-treated workers can identify labor market externalities. The key identification requirement
is that treated and non-treated workers are in the same labor market, where a labor market
is defined as the market place where workers compete for the same vacancies. From a search-
theoretic standpoint, this definition is the most natural: it follows from the law of one price,
which defines one equilibrium labor market tightness for each labor market. In practice this
means that each labor market is characterized by a vacancy type, and matching between the
workers competing for these vacancies and employers posting these vacancies exhibits random-
ness. In other words, when treated and non-treated workers compete for these vacancies, a
firm opening one such vacancy cannot know whether it will be matched to a treated or to a
non-treated worker. When this is the case, we show in appendix A.2 that variations in the job
finding probability of non-treated workers in response to a change of UI for treated workers will
identify market externalities of UI and that, as the size of the treated group compared to the
non-treated group increases, market externalities on non-treated workers converge to identifying
the equilibrium effects of treating the whole market. Importantly, market externalities identified
through the change in the job finding probability of non-treated workers will capture the wage
effect even if wages are bargained at the individual level. The intuition is that within a labor
market, because of random matching, the expected profit of opening vacancies is the weighted
average of the profits of opening vacancies for each group of workers. Therefore the increase in
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bargained wages of treated workers will reduce the expected profit of opening vacancies and will
then affect overall vacancy posting in the market.
In appendix A.3, we also discuss the case when treated and non-treated workers do not
compete for the same vacancies, for instance because firms can discriminate between treated
and non-treated workers by offering them different types of vacancies. In that case, non-treated
workers will not be in the same labor market as treated workers and changes in the job finding
probability of non-treated workers will no longer directly identify variations in labor market
tightness for the treated labor market. Yet, UI variations for treated workers may nevertheless
still create externalities for non-treated workers. As shown in appendix A.3, such externalities
will arise across labor markets due to substitution effects and are different in nature and mag-
nitude from market externalities within a labor market. The existence of externalities across
labor markets due to substitution effects bears implications for the interpretation of our results
that we discuss in section 6.
Identification of market externalities of UI extensions within a labor market requires the
ability to find two groups of workers with different UI levels within the same labor market, i.e.
competing for similar vacancies. Using vacancy data, we propose below a simple method to
determine whether two groups of workers are competing for similar job vacancies by looking
at how characteristics of job vacancies predict the group affiliation of the individual filling the
vacancy.
3 Austrian Unemployment Insurance and the REBP
Unemployment Insurance and Wage Setting Systems The Austrian UI system is more
restrictive than many other continental European systems and closer to the U.S. system in terms
of generosity. Workers who become unemployed can draw regular unemployment benefits (UB),
the amount of which depends on previous earnings. In 1990, the replacement ratio (UB relative
to gross monthly earnings) was 40.4 % for the median income earner; 48.2 % for a worker earning
half the median; and 29.6 % for a worker earning twice the median. UB payments are not taxed,
not means-tested, and there is no experience rating.
The maximum number of weeks that one can receive UB (potential duration) depends on
work history (the number of weeks worked prior to becoming unemployed) and age. For the age
group 50 and older, UB-duration is 52 weeks; and for the age group 40-49, UB-duration is 39
weeks. Voluntary quitters and workers laid off for misconduct can receive UB but are subject
to a waiting period of 4 weeks. UB recipients need to search actively for a new job within the
scope of the claimant’s qualifications. After UB payments have been exhausted, job seekers can
apply for post-UB transfers (“Notstandshilfe”). These transfers are means-tested and depend on
income and wealth of other family members and close relatives. They are granted for successive
39-week periods after which eligibility requirements are recurrently checked and can last for an
indefinite time period. Post-UB transfers can be at most 92 % of UB. In 1990, the median
post-UB transfer payment was about 70 % of the median UB. The majority of the unemployed
(59 %) received UB whereas 26 % received post-UB transfers.
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Another relevant feature of the Austrian labor market is its system of wage formation.
Almost all workers are covered by collective agreements which take place at the sectoral (or
the occupational) level. Collective agreements impose a lower bound on workers’ wages. While
the Austrian wage setting process is more centralized than in the US and many European
countries (except for Scandinavia), wages are less rigid than one might prima facie think. First,
while Austrian wage setting institutions impose a lot of downward rigidity on wages in ongoing
employment relationships, wage adjustments take place when workers change jobs or start a new
job after an unemployment spell. Second, existing evidence suggests that a substantial fraction
of workers are paid above the collectively agreed minimum wage.6 To the extent that older
workers are more experienced and achieve higher wages than the collectively agreed wages, the
wage floors of collective agreements are unlikely to contaminate our analysis.
Restructuring of the Austrian steel industry and the REBP After World War II,
Austria nationalized large parts of its heavy industries (iron, steel, etc). Firms in the steel
sector were part of a large holding company owned by the state, the Oesterreichische Industrie
AG, OeIAG. In 1986, after the steel industry was hit by an oil speculation scandal and failure
of a US steel-plant project, a new management was appointed and a strict restructuring plan
was implemented resulting in plant closures and downsizing.
To mitigate the labor market consequences of the restructuring plan, the Austrian govern-
ment enacted the Regional Extended Benefit Program (REBP) that extended UB-entitlement
to 209 weeks. To be eligible to 209 weeks of UB, the worker had to satisfy each of the following
criteria at the beginning of his or her unemployment spell: (i) age 50 or older; (ii) a continuous
work history (780 employment weeks during the last 25 years prior to the current unemploy-
ment spell); (iii) location of residence in one of 28 selected labor market districts for at least 6
months prior to the claim; and (iv) start of a new unemployment spell after June 1988 or spell
in progress in June 1988. Note that the REBP did not impose any industry requirement. All
unemployed who met criteria (i) to (iv) were eligible, irrespective of whether they previously
worked in the steel sector or not.
The REBP was in effect until December 1991 before a reform was implemented in January
1992. This reform enacted two changes for new spells. First, the benefit extension was abolished
in 6 of the originally 28 regions. We exclude from our analysis the set of treated regions that
were excluded after the 1991-reform. Second, the 1991-reform tightened eligibility criteria for
extended benefits: new beneficiaries had to be not only residents, but also previously employed
in a treated region. The program stopped accepting new entrants in August 1, 1993. Job seekers
who established eligibility to REBP before August 1993 continued to be covered. We therefore
set the end of the REBP program in August 6, 1997 (209 weeks after August 1, 1993).
Apart from the REBP, the second measure to alleviate the problems associated with mass
redundancies in the steel sector was the so-called ’steel foundation’. Firms in the steel sec-
6Leoni and Pollan [2011] study “overpayments” (the ratio of effective wages over collectively bargained wages).
They find that, in the years when the REBP was in place, effective wages of blue collar workers were, on average,
between 20 to 25 percent above the collectively bargained minimum wages. Hence a large fraction of workers is
paid above the wage floor.
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tor could decide whether to join in order to provide their displaced workers with re-training
activities that were organized by the foundation. Member firms were obliged to finance the
foundation. Displaced individuals who decided to join this out-placement center were entitled
to regular unemployment benefits for a period of up to 3 years (later 4 years) regardless of age
and experience. In 1988, the foundation consisted of 22 firms. We exclude all workers employed
or reemployed in the steel sector to make sure that the workers in our sample did not have
access to re-training activities provided by the steel foundation. Notice further that no other
labor market policies were put in place during the REBP period that may confound the effect
of the program. Lalive and Zweimu¨ller [2004b] provide an extensive discussion of the context
and institutional background of the REBP and discuss the validity of the REBP as a research
design.
As the REBP was targeted to older workers it could also be used as a pathway to early
retirement, the main pathway being retirement via the disability insurance system. The existence
of these early retirement programs creates potential complementarities with the REBP program
that are susceptible to affect search effort and labor supply in non-trivial ways (Inderbitzin et
al. [2013]). In order to minimize these complementarity effects and concentrate on the effects of
the REBP program alone, we focus primarily our analysis on male workers aged 50-54 as they
cannot use unemployment benefits as a direct pathway to early retirement.
4 Data and identification strategy
Data Our data set covers the universe of UI spells in Austria from 1980 to 2009. In our
baseline estimation sample, and for reasons that we explain below, we focus on all unemployed
men aged 46 to 54 at the start of a spell. For each spell, we observe the dates of entry and
exit into paid unemployment, as well as information on age at the start of the spell, region
of residence at the beginning of the spell, education, marital status, etc. This information is
merged at the individual level with the universe of social security data in Austria (Austrian
Social Security Database, ASSD), which contains information on each employment spell as well
as information for each spell in a benefit program and information on pensions and retirement.
We use complementary information on insurance spells back until 1949 to compute work history
in the past 25 years for each individual to precisely determine a worker’s REBP eligibility status.7
We also use social security data to compute wages before and after each unemployment spell, as
well as the total duration of non-employment after the end of an employment spell. Finally, the
social security data gives us useful information about previous and subsequent employers (such
as industry, location, etc.) for each unemployment spell.
Because of early retirement programs in Austria during our period of analysis, women above
7For more information about the ASSD, see Zweimu¨ller et al. [2009]. The ASSD covers employment spells
from 1972 onwards. To measure worker’s experience during the last 25 years (necessary to determine REBP-
eligibility), we used complementary data from the Austrian Ministry of Social Affairs on employment spells back
to 1949. (The UI administration used a similar source of information on individual experience to determine
REBP-eligibility.) As we do not observe final eligibility to REBP, our approach is an intent-to-treat approach.
There are a few observations with an experience level below the REBP eligibility threshold who still received more
than 52 weeks of paid UI. We get rid of these few obviously misclassified observations in our estimation sample.
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50 and men above 55 can go directly from REBP or from regular unemployment benefits to
early retirement programs. For these workers, it is therefore unclear whether the effect of REBP
can be interpreted as a reduction in search effort or as an extensive margin decision to exit
the labor market. Search responses to UI along the intensive margin and exits from the labor
markets have potentially different implications for equilibrium analysis. Because our focus is on
search externalities arising from responses to UI along the intensive margin, we mainly focus on
unemployed men aged below 55 because they cannot go directly from unemployment to early
retirement. In our robustness analysis, we show that our results are robust to these sample
restrictions, and that externalities can be detected on women, and on all men aged up to 59.
To determine which workers are competing for the same vacancies as REBP eligible workers,
we use detailed micro data on job vacancies posted in public employment agencies available for
the period 1994-1998.8 This data has two important features. First, the data records detailed
information about the characteristics of the vacancy.9 Second, the vacancy data contains the
personal identifier of the person who was hired for the position. We use the identifier to see
whether the successful job seeker was eligible for REBP or not.
Identification in an experimental setting We first discuss identification in an experimental
framework and discuss below how we implement it in the actual REBP setting. There are two
labor markets, M = 0, 1. Labor market M = 1 is randomly selected to receive some exogenous
treatment, i.e. an increase in the potential duration of UI benefits. Labor market M = 0
does not receive treatment and acts as a control. In labor market M = 1, a random subset
of workers is treated (T = 1) and receives a larger potential duration of UI benefits while the
rest of the workers do not receive treatment (T = 0). There are three potential outcomes yTiM
(where i indexes individuals): y1i1, when being treated in a treated labor market, y
0
i1, when being
untreated in a treated labor market, and y0i0 when being in a non-treated labor market. We are
interested in the average externality of the treatment on outcome yi, AE = E(y
0
i1 − y0i0).
Following the treatment evaluation literature, we can relate observed outcomes to the average
externality on the non-treated in treated labor markets, AENTT :
E(y0i1|T = 0,M = 1)− E(y0i0|T = 0,M = 0) =
AENTT︷ ︸︸ ︷
E(y0i1 − y0i0|T = 0,M = 1)
+E(y0i0|T = 0,M = 1)− E(y0i0|T = 0,M = 0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
selection
(1)
Under double randomization (of treated labor markets and of treated individuals within labor
markets), the selection term in equation 1 is zero and AENTT can be identified by comparing
8We also have some crude vacancy data available for the period 1990-1994 that we use to compute initial
labor market tightness in appendix table 9. Unfortunately, we were not able to find or construct consistent data
throughout the period enabling us to analyze vacancy responses to the REBP.
9This includes the firm identifier of the firm posting the vacancy, the date (in month) at which the vacancy is
opened and the date at which it is closed, the reason for closing the vacancy, the identifier of the public employment
service where the vacancy is posted, the industry and job classifications of the job, details on the duration and
type of the contract, the age requirement if any, the education requirement if any, the gender requirement if any,
and the posted wage or range of wage if any.
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observed outcomes for the non-treated in labor market M = 1 to observed outcomes for workers
in labor market M = 0.
In our case, REBP treatment was not allocated at random, neither across nor within labor
markets. Our empirical strategy identifies AENTT adopting a difference-in-difference design.
This design is valid if unobserved differences between non-treated workers in markets M = 0
and M = 1 remain fixed over time. We discuss below whether this assumption is plausible and
probe it in the context of robustness analyses.
In our context, treated workers (T = 1) are workers who are eligible for REBP, based on the
three eligibility criteria: age, experience and geography. To implement our diff-in-diff strategy,
(i) we need to properly define treated labor markets M = 1 and (ii), we also need to properly
define control labor markets M = 0.
Defining treated labor markets Our analysis focuses on non-eligible workers within REBP
counties, i.e. on workers who both live and had previous employment in REBP counties. How-
ever, to properly define treated labor markets, we want to focus on non-eligible workers within
REBP counties who actually compete for the same job vacancies as treated workers. If treated
and non-treated workers are competing for similar vacancies, the effect of the REBP on non-
treated workers can identify equilibrium variations in labor market tightness in the labor market.
If treated and non-treated workers are competing for different vacancies, there are in practice
two search markets for labor, and the effect of the program on non-treated workers identify
market externalities due to substitution effects.
To determine which groups of workers within REBP counties are competing for the same
vacancies as REBP eligible workers, we propose a method based on micro data on job vacancies.
The vacancy data contain, for each individual vacancy, detailed information about the charac-
teristics of the vacancy and the personal identifier of the person who filled the vacancy. Our
strategy uses all the information on each vacancy, and estimates how well the characteristics of
each vacancy predict the REBP eligibility status of the worker who fills the vacancy. (Data and
empirical strategy are discussed in detail in appendix B.)
To implement this strategy, we regress the probability that the worker filling a given vacancy
is eligible to REBP on a vector of all the characteristics of the vacancy and run the model
separately for various categories of non-eligible workers against eligible workers. For each of
the categories of non-eligible workers, we then analyze the predictive power of the model using
various goodness-of-fit measures.10
In figure 2 panel A, we plot the p-value of two standard goodness-of-fit tests for the logit
model, the Pearson’s χ2 goodness-of-fit test and the Hosmer-Lemeshow χ2 goodness-of-fit test,
for different categories of non-eligible workers. A low p-value for the test indicates a poor fit
of the data. Both tests suggest that the model fits the data very well for comparing eligible
10This model aims at testing the ability of firms to direct their search towards different types of workers, who
have different search effort due to REBP, by opening different types of vacancies. We therefore estimate it in
REBP regions when the REBP was in place. In places or times where REBP is not in place, workers eligible to
REBP (would the REBP be in place) and non-eligible workers have the same level of UI benefits, their search
effort is likely to be very similar, and firms have therefore much less incentives to direct search differently or to
discriminate between these different types of workers.
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workers to non-eligible workers aged 35 to 40, but tend to perform more and more poorly as we
use non-eligible workers that are older. When comparing eligible workers to non-eligible workers
aged 50 to 54, the p-value is very close to zero, and the goodness-of-fit of the model is extremely
poor. In panel B of figure 2, we plot the fraction of observations that are incorrectly predicted
by the model (i.e. the predicted eligibility status to REBP is different from the true eligibility
status of the worker filling the vacancy) for all categories of non-eligible workers. The fraction
of misclassified observations is less than 7.5% for the model comparing eligible workers to non-
eligible workers aged 30 to 40, but increases up to more than 25% for the model comparing
eligible workers to non-eligible workers aged 50 to to 54. We also plot the fraction of type I
errors, i.e. the fraction of true non-eligible workers that are predicted as being eligible to REBP
by the model.11 The figure indicates that type I errors are very uncommon when comparing
eligible workers to non-eligible workers below 50, but they seem to be particularly severe when
comparing eligible workers to non-eligible workers aged 50 to 54.12
These results are helpful for our identification strategy as they reveal which groups of non-
eligible workers are more likely to identify UI market externalities. Workers aged 30 to 40 seem to
fill vacancies that have characteristics that are very different from the vacancies filled by eligible
workers. But eligible and non-eligible workers above 50 seem to fill vacancies that have very
similar characteristics. This suggests that workers aged 30 to 40 are likely to be in a different
job search market than eligible workers. As we move towards older ages, workers seem to be in
closer competition for the same vacancies as eligible workers. For non-eligible workers aged 50
to 54, this competition seems the most intense. As a consequence, in our baseline sample, we
focus attention to workers with age between 46 and 54 at the start of a spell.
Defining control labor markets To define control labor markets, we exploit primarily the
geographical dimension of REBP and use workers of non-REBP counties who have similar char-
acteristics as workers in our treated labor markets. This approach will only be valid if labor
markets in non-REBP counties are not too integrated to labor markets in REBP counties. Oth-
erwise, workers in non-REBP counties might also be subject to treatment externalities, which
would bias towards zero the externalities estimated from comparing non-eligible workers in
REBP and non-REBP counties.
To get a sense of how geographically integrated the labor markets of REBP and non-REBP
counties are, we compute the fraction of new hires in non-REBP counties who come from REBP
counties. In figure 1 panel A, we map the average quarterly fraction of men aged 46 to 54 coming
from REBP counties in the total number of new hires of men aged 46 to 54 in non-REBP regions
for all the years when the REBP was not in place (1980-1988 and 1998-2009). There are few
11Type I errors are particularly relevant in our context. They provide information about how likely it is
that a non-eligible worker is competing for a vacancy that has been “tailored” to eligible workers based on its
characteristics. In this sense, type I errors provide direct information about the intensity of the competition that
eligible workers receive from various groups of non-eligible workers when a vacancy is opened in “their” search
market.
12Because classification is sensitive to the relative sizes of each component group, and always favors classification
into the larger group, the classification error measures of panel B should still be interpreted with caution. We
therefore tend to prefer goodness-of-fit measures presented in panel A.
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counties where this fraction is above 5% and only in a handful of counties is this fraction above
20%. Most of these counties are located in a narrow bandwidth, at a distance of 20 to 30
minutes to the border of REBP counties. Because workers in these counties face competition
from workers coming from REBP counties, they might be affected by spillover effects of the
REBP program. Thus, in our baseline sample, we remove the few counties with more than 5%
of new hires coming from REBP regions. In our robustness analysis, we use these counties to
show that we can also detect the presence of geographical externalities in these counties highly
integrated to REBP regions.
In figure 1 panel B, we map the average quarterly fraction of men aged 46 to 54 coming from
non-REBP regions in the total number of new hires of men aged 46 to 54 in REBP counties
for all years when the REBP was not in place. This measures the degree of competition from
non-REBP workers faced by workers in REBP counties. The map shows that this competition
is on average limited, except for a few counties close to the REBP border. Panel B shows that
there is interesting variation in the openness of REBP counties to non-REBP residents, which
creates variation in treatment intensity across REBP counties that we use in section 5.
Identifying assumption To identify UI externalities, our strategy relies on comparing work-
ers in REBP counties who are non-eligible (because of failing either the age or the experience
requirement) to similar workers in non-REBP counties. This diff-in-diff strategy relies on a
parallel trend assumption for non-eligible workers in REBP and non-REBP counties.
The main concern with regard to our parallel trend assumption is the presence of region-
specific shocks in REBP vs non-REBP counties contemporaneous to the REBP program. Indeed,
as stated in section 3, treated regions were chosen because of their higher share of employment
in the steel sector that was being restructured. To address this issue, we start our analysis
on a sample restricted to non-steel workers only, which means workers who are never observed
working in the steel sector, either before, during or after the REBP. Because the steel sector
only accounts for at most 15% of employment in REBP counties, the spillover effects of the
restructuring can be assumed to be small on industries not directly related to the steel industry
supply chain. We show compelling graphical evidence in favor of our parallel trend assumption
in the next section. We also provide in our sensitivity analysis several robustness tests to control
for region-specific shocks and to explore the sensitivity of our results to this sample restriction.
Descriptive statistics Table 1 gives descriptive statistics of our baseline estimation sample
for the REBP and non-REBP periods. In panel A, we compare REBP and non-REBP counties
and begin by showing simple labor market indicators for REBP and non-REBP counties. Regions
participating in the REBP program are not chosen at random, but because of the importance
of their steel sector. The average quarterly fraction of employment in the steel sector in REBP
counties was 15% versus 5% in non-REBP counties. To control for the potential endogeneity
bias in the choice of REBP counties, we remove the steel sector from our baseline estimation
sample. More specifically, we get rid of all unemployed who ever worked in the steel sector prior
to or after becoming unemployed. The monthly unemployment rate for the 46 to 54 years old
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was the same on average (5.5%) in REBP and non-REBP counties during non-REBP years.
In the remainder of table 1 panel A, we show descriptive statistics on our estimation sample
of unemployed men, aged 46 to 54, who never work in the steel sector. In our sample, the
fraction of unemployed eligible to REBP (above 50 years old or with more than 15 years of
continuous work history in the past 25 years) is between 40 and 50%. REBP and non-REBP
counties are extremely similar for all non-REBP years in terms of labor market outcomes: the
duration of unemployment spells and the duration of non-employment spells were roughly the
same for unemployed in REBP and non-REBP counties.13 Gross unconditional wages were
slightly higher in REBP counties.
In table 1 panel B, we display descriptive statistics for eligible and non-eligible unemployed
workers in REBP counties in our estimation sample of unemployed men, aged 46 to 54 outside
the steel sector. Eligible unemployed are defined as unemployed aged above 50 at the start of
their spell or with more than 15 years of work history in the past 25 years, who reside in REBP
counties and whose previous employer was also in a REBP county. Non-eligible unemployed are
those who were below 50 at the start of their spell or who have worked less than 15 years out of
the previous 25 years. Eligible workers are therefore slightly older in our sample, but have similar
job search outcomes. Non-eligible unemployed have a slightly lower duration of unemployment
during the non-REBP period. Non-eligible unemployed had slightly lower unconditional gross
real wages, but had equivalent level of education, and were also similar in terms of other socio-
demographic characteristics such as education or marital status.
5 Empirical evidence of market externalities
Graphical evidence We begin by providing graphical evidence of the presence of externalities
of the REBP program on non-eligible unemployed workers in REBP counties. Figure 3 plots the
evolution of the difference in unemployment duration between REBP and non-REBP counties
for eligible and non-eligible workers. More specifically, for each group of workers (eligible workers
in panel A, all non-eligible workers aged 46 to 54 in panel B, and non-eligible workers aged 50
to 54 in panel C), we run the following regression:
yit =
∑
βt1[T = t] +
∑
dt(1[T = t] · 1[M = 1]) +X ′γ + εit (2)
where 1[T = t] is an indicator for the start of the unemployment spell being in year t and
1[M = 1] is an indicator for residing in a county treated with REBP. The vector of controls
X include education, 15 industry codes, family status, citizenship and tenure in previous job.
We plot in figure 3 for each group of workers the estimated coefficients dt which gives us the
difference between REBP and non-REBP regions. In all panels, the first red vertical line denotes
the beginning of the REBP program, and the two dashed red vertical lines denote the last entry
into REBP program at the end of July 1993, and the end of the REBP program when eligible
13All duration outcomes are expressed in weeks. Non-employment is defined as the number of weeks between
two employment spells. Unemployment duration is the duration of paid unemployment recorded in the UI
administrative data.
13
unemployed exhaust their last REBP-related benefits.
Panel A plots the estimated difference dt each year between REBP and non-REBP counties
for workers above age 50 with more than 15 years of continuous work history, and therefore
eligible for the REBP. Figure 3 shows that the introduction of program induced a large reduction
in labor supply of eligible workers in treated regions, which translates into a large increase in
unemployment durations. This difference in unemployment duration disappears for workers
entering unemployment from 1994 on, when the REBP no longer accepted new entrants. Year
1993 can therefore be seen as the peak of the program effect on aggregate labor supply, since
this is the moment where the stock of REBP-eligible unemployed is the highest, and the labor
supply of treated workers is the lowest.
Panel B plots the difference across REBP and non-REBP regions for all non-eligible workers
aged 46 to 54 (below 50 years old or with less than 15 years of continuous work history in the
past 25 years), we see the opposite pattern taking place. After the introduction of the REBP,
non-eligible workers in REBP regions tend to experience shorter unemployment spells, and a
higher exit rate out of unemployment. This effect culminates in 1993, when the effect of the
REBP on aggregate labor supply of eligible workers is at its peak. The difference then reverts
back to zero as the REBP program is scaled down.
Panel C plots the difference across REBP and non-REBP regions focusing on non-eligible
workers aged 50 to 54 (with less than 15 years of continuous work history in the past 25 years).
The exact same pattern is visible, and even more pronounced. While they experience similar
unemployment durations prior to the REBP, non-eligible workers above 50 experience much
shorter unemployment spells during the REBP period in REBP regions compared to similar
non-eligible workers in non-REBP regions, and the effect culminates in 1993. The difference
then quickly reverts back to zero as the REBP program is rolled back.
Figure 4 shows the relationship between age and unemployment durations for all non-eligible
workers in REBP and non-REBP counties when REBP was not in place (panel A), and the peak
period when REBP was in action (January 1992 to December 1995, panel B). The figure presents
the average duration of unemployment in bins of age at the start of unemployment where the
bin size is two months of age. In REBP counties, to make the distinction more visible between
non-eligible workers due to age (below 50) and due to work experience only (age 50 to 54), we
plot them in different marker shapes. We also fit the data with a third-order polynomial for
REBP and non-REBP counties.
Panel A shows that during the non-REBP period, the relationship between age and unem-
ployment duration is almost flat and extremely similar for non-eligible workers in REBP and
non-REBP regions. Panel B shows that non-eligible workers experienced shorter unemployment
spells in REBP regions compared to non-REBP regions. Interestingly, this difference in un-
employment duration between REBP and non-REBP counties is sharply increasing with age:
unemployed individuals below 45 in REBP regions do not fare very differently from similar
unemployed in non-REBP regions during the REBP period, but unemployed individuals above
50 in REBP counties experienced much shorter spells than similar unemployed in non-REBP
counties.
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Baseline results In table 2, we present results summing up our graphical evidence, by esti-
mating models of the following form:
Yit = α+
Effect of REBP on eligible︷ ︸︸ ︷
β0 ·H ·M · T˜t +
Effect of REBP on non-eligible︷ ︸︸ ︷
γ0 · (1−H) ·M · Tt +η0 ·M +
∑
νt
+η1 ·H+ η2 ·M ·H+
∑
ιt ·H+X ′itρ+ εit (3)
where Yit are different search outcomes of interest, M is an indicator for residing in a REBP
county,14 Tt is an indicator for spells starting between June 1988 and July 1997, and T˜t is an
indicator for spells starting between June 1988 and July 1993. H is an indicator of REBP-
eligibility and is equal to one for unemployed individuals above 50 years old and with more than
15 years of continuous work history in the past 25 years at the time they become unemployed. β0
identifies the effect of the REBP on eligible workers, while γ0 identifies spillovers of the REBP on
non-eligible workers in REBP regions.
∑
νt is a series of year fixed effects. Because we control
for eligibility fixed effects (H) interacted with both the REBP-county indicator (M) and year
fixed effects, specification (3) amounts to pooling two diff-in-diffs together, one for the REBP
effect on eligible unemployed workers and one for the REBP effect on non-eligible unemployed
workers.
In column (1) of table 2, we estimate this model without any other controls. In column
(2) we add a vector of controls X which includes education, 15 industry codes, family status,
citizenship and tenure in previous job. In column (3) to (6) we also add controls for preexisting
trends by region. Panel A displays estimates of β0, the diff-in-diff estimate of the effect of the
REBP on eligible workers. Results confirm that the REBP increased unemployment duration
by roughly 45 weeks for eligible unemployed compared to similar unemployed workers in non-
REBP counties. In column (4), we estimate the same model using as an outcome the duration of
total non-employment (conditional on finding a job at the end of the unemployment spell). The
direct effect of the REBP on eligible unemployed is a little smaller in magnitude (+29 weeks),
which suggests that some eligible workers did exhaust their unemployment benefits and never
got back to work. Columns (5) and (6) focus on the probability of having a spell longer than
100 and 26 weeks respectively, and confirm that the REBP shifted the whole survival function
of unemployed eligible to the REBP.
Panel B displays estimates of γ0, the REBP effect on all non-eligible workers aged 46 to 54
in REBP counties.15 Results confirm that non-eligible workers in REBP counties experienced a
significant decrease in their unemployment duration of 2 to 4 weeks compared to similar workers
14We remove the few observations of individuals who reside in REBP counties and whose previous employer
was in a non-REBP county, since their eligibility to the REBP changed in 1991.
15To flexibly correct for the presence of temporary common random shocks that may affect the entire REBP
region, or alternatively the entire non-REBP region, we cluster standard errors at the region-year level. In
appendix table 6, we also provide evidence of the robustness of our results to various inference strategies. We
have checked sensitivity of inference in three ways. First, we allow for clustering by markets defined as county-by-
industry-by-education cells. Second, we implement spatial HAC standard errors as in Conley [1999]. Finally, we
implemented permutation based standard errors as in Chetty et al. [2014] and Lalive et al. [2013]. All the details
are provided in appendix C.
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in non-REBP counties. Column (4) shows that the effect is of similar magnitude on the duration
of total non-employment which means that the positive REBP effect on non-eligible workers is
truly about finding a job faster. Columns (5) and (6) show that the reduction in unemployment
durations for non-eligible unemployed is due to a significant reduction in both short and long
unemployment spells.
Section 4 has shown that we should expect heterogeneity in the magnitude of externalities
across different groups of non-eligible workers. In particular, non-eligible workers above 50
seem the most likely to compete for the same vacancies as workers eligible to the REBP and
therefore more likely to experience larger externalities. To investigate heterogeneity in market
externalities, we split the results between non-eligible workers based on age and non-eligible
workers based on the work history requirement. In panel C, we focus on the REBP effect for
non-eligible workers age 46 to 49 who are non-eligible based on age. Results show that the REBP
significantly reduced the duration of unemployment and of total non-employment of non-eligible
workers aged 46 to 49 by 2 to 3 weeks. Panel D shows the REBP effect for non-eligible workers
aged 50 or above who are non-eligible based on the experience requirement. Results confirm
our earlier graphical evidence showing that market externalities for this group of non-eligible
workers are larger. The REBP significantly reduced the duration of unemployment and of total
non-employment of non-eligible workers above 50 by 6 to 9 weeks.
Robustness In appendix table 7, we start by exploring the sensitivity of our results to our
sample restrictions. In our baseline sample, we have excluded workers above 54 and women to
minimize the concern that male workers between 55 and 59 and female workers can use REBP as
a direct pathway to retirement. In panel A, we run specification 3 on a sample including all men
up to 59. In panel B, we also include women in the estimation sample. In both panels, estimates
are extremely similar to our baseline results, with significant externalities on unemployment
durations of non-eligible workers of 2 to 3.5 weeks. In panel C, we also include steel sector workers
in the estimation sample, which had been excluded from the baseline sample to alleviate the
concern of non-parallel trends between REBP and non-REBP counties.16 Estimated externalities
on non-eligible workers are again very similar to our baseline results. Given that steel sector
workers represent a relatively small fraction of treated labor markets in REBP counties, these
results are not very surprising.
The second potential concern with regard to our results is that unobserved characteristics
correlated with job search outcomes might change during the REBP period for non-eligible
workers. Such a change in unobserved characteristics of non-eligible workers would lead to a
violation of our parallel trend assumption and bias our estimates of the market externalities
of the REBP on non-eligible workers. To investigate this concern, we look at inflow rates into
unemployment for eligible and non-eligible workers in REBP regions versus non-REBP regions.
We run the previous diff-in-diff model on the quarterly log separation rate by region for all male
workers age 46 to 54, broken down by REBP eligibility status. Results are reported in column
16Steel sector workers are defined as workers who ever had employment in the steel sector between 1980 and
2009.
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(1) of table 3. The REBP has had a large positive effect on the log separation rate of eligible
workers in REBP regions but has not affected the log separation rate of non-eligible workers in
REBP regions.17 In the remainder of table 3, we look at the effect of REBP on characteristics
that are likely to be correlated with productivity and job search outcomes. In columns (2)
and (3), we run the diff-in-diff model of equation 3 on the log wage in previous job (prior to
becoming unemployed), controlling for observable characteristics. We cannot detect any effect of
the REBP program on the distribution of residual wages in previous job of non-eligible workers
in REBP regions. For eligible workers, there is a small though not significant positive effect,
which suggests that eligible unemployed who took up REBP had slightly better wages in their
previous job. In column (4) and (5) we look at the logarithm of tenure in the previous job (prior
to becoming unemployed). Again, we find almost no effect for non-eligible workers and a small
positive effect for eligible workers. Overall, these findings alleviate the concern of an important
change in unobserved characteristics of non-eligible workers in REBP regions at the time of the
REBP program.
The third concern with our baseline estimates is the possible presence of differential region-
specific shocks at the time the REBP program was in place. This concern is valid given that
REBP counties were not chosen at random but because of the relative importance of their steel
sector. Yet note that the fraction of steel sector employees never exceeds 15% of the labor force
in these counties, and we restrict our baseline sample to individuals who never were employed
in the steel sector. Also, because REBP counties were experiencing a restructuring of the steel
sector, we should expect the region-specific shock to be negative during the REBP period for
REBP counties, which would lead to higher unemployment durations for non-eligible workers.
In this sense, region-specific shocks are likely, if anything, to bias downward the magnitude of
our estimates of the search externalities for non-eligible workers.
To further investigate the robustness of our results to the presence of region-specific shocks,
we use men below age 40 in REBP counties as a control, instead of workers from non-REBP
counties. To do so, we run on a sample restricted to unemployed aged 30 to 39 and 50 to 54
in REBP counties a diff-in-diff specification equivalent to equation (3) where we replace M by
A = 1[Age > 50]. This specification enables us to control for shocks to the labor markets
of REBP counties contemporaneous to the REBP that affect all job seekers in the same way.
Results are reported in appendix table 8. Estimated externalities on non-eligible unemployed
aged 50 to 54 are virtually unaffected compared to table 2 panel D. This suggests that our
estimated externalities are not driven by labor market shocks specific to REBP counties and
contemporaneous to the REBP period.
17We discuss in online appendix section A.4 the theoretical consequences of this increase in the separation rate
of eligible workers. When layoffs are endogenous to UI, an increase in the separation rate of eligible workers is
equivalent to a downward shift in labor supply, and is therefore analogous to a decrease in search effort. But
an increase in the separation rate may also decrease labor demand by decreasing the net return from opening
vacancies. The relative magnitude of these two effects will therefore determine if endogenous layoffs deepens
or attenuates the effect of UI on equilibrium labor market tightness and therefore the magnitude of market
externalities.
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Treatment intensity The magnitude of market externalities depends on treatment intensity,
i.e. the relative size of the treated group of eligible unemployed compared to the non-treated
group of non-eligible workers (appendix A.2). To investigate how estimated externalities vary
with treatment intensity, we look at different measures of treatment intensity and interact these
measures with the REBP effect on non-eligible workers. The estimated specification is
Yit = α+ β0 ·H ·M · T˜t + (γH0 · 1[Treat=High] + γL0 · 1[Treat=Low]) · (1−H) ·M · Tt
+η0 ·M +
∑
νt + η1 ·H+ η2 ·M ·H+
∑
ιt ·H+X ′itρ+ εit (4)
where 1[Treat=High] and 1[Treat=Low] are indicators for a proxy of treatment intensity being
above or below some threshold.
We use two methods to characterize treatment intensity. In the first method, we start by
computing the average quarterly fraction of new hires coming from non-REBP counties among
all new hires of men aged 46 to 54 for each REBP county when the REBP was not in place
as shown in figure 1 panel B. Counties that, absent REBP, had on average a high fraction
of hires coming from non-REBP regions have labor markets that are more integrated to non-
REBP regions and the REBP effect on aggregate search effort within these counties is likely
to be smaller than in counties that hardly ever hire individuals from non-REBP regions. We
define high treatment intensity counties as counties where the fraction of new hires coming
from non-REBP counties is lower than 5% which corresponds to the median value across REBP
counties. Table 4 panel A displays the results and shows that the effect of REBP on non-eligible
unemployed was significantly stronger in counties with a low level of integration to non-REBP
counties. REBP induced a reduction in non-employment duration of non-eligible workers of only
.7 weeks in low treatment counties but of 4.2 weeks in high treatment counties. When zooming
on non-eligible workers aged 50 and above, this pattern is even more striking, with a reduction
in the average duration of unemployment of 4 weeks for low treatment counties and of more
than 10 weeks for high treatment counties.
We confirm the robustness of these results using a second measure of treatment inten-
sity. We compute the average yearly fraction of eligible workers among the 50+ for each
region×industry×education cell during REBP years and define by high treatment intensity a
cell where the fraction of eligible 50+ unemployed was more than 90% (the median value across
all region×industry×education cells).18 Results are displayed in table 4 panel B and confirm the
pattern found using our first measure of treatment intensity. In low treatment-intensity cells,
the estimated externalities of REBP on non-eligible workers are approximately two times smaller
than in high treatment-intensity cells, and this pattern is valid for all non-eligible workers, as
well as for non-eligible workers above 50.
Landais et al. [2010] show that in the presence of “job rationing”, externalities should be
larger when initial labor market tightness is low as job rationing will be more intense, exacerbat-
ing the rat race effect. In appendix table 9 we therefore also explore heterogeneity in estimated
externalities with respect to the initial level of labor market tightness. Unfortunately, the first
18A region is defined as the first two digits of the municipality identifiers.
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year for which we have some vacancy information by county is 1990 and we cannot compute labor
market tightness prior to REBP. We compute initial labor market tightness as of 1990 by divid-
ing the average monthly number of vacancies posted in 1990 in each county×industry×education
cell, by the average monthly number of unemployed in the same county×industry×education
cell. And we define low tightness cells as county×industry×education cells where initial tight-
ness is below the median of initial tightness across all cells. Results, displayed in table 9, suggest
that non-eligible workers in low tightness cells experienced significantly shorter unemployment
spells due to REBP than non-eligible workers in high initial tightness cells. When focusing on
non-eligible workers above 50, we also find strong suggestive evidence that REBP externalities
were significantly stronger in labor markets with low tightness at the start of REBP.
Geographical spillovers So far, we have excluded from our sample unemployed residing
in non-REBP counties that had labor markets highly integrated to REBP counties before the
REBP. These counties are likely to experience spillover effects from REBP counties and cannot
serve as a proper control in our diff-in-diff strategy. We now investigate directly whether we can
detect the presence of REBP externalities on unemployed workers residing in these counties. We
begin by running a simple diff-in-diff specification comparing unemployed workers residing in
non-REBP counties with high integration to REBP counties to unemployed workers residing in
non-REBP counties with low level of integration.19 We restrict our sample to male unemployed
workers aged 50 to 54 with more than 15 years of experience, who would be eligible to the
REBP if residing in REBP counties. Results are reported in panel A of table 5 and suggest that
the REBP reduced the duration of unemployment spells by 4 weeks for unemployed workers
in non-REBP counties with high labor market integration to REBP counties relative to similar
workers in non-REBP counties with little labor market integration to REBP counties.
In panel B of table 5, we use a finer measure of labor market integration by looking at
county×industry×education cells, and we compare unemployed workers in cells where the av-
erage fraction of hires from REBP counties in total yearly hires was larger than 20% before
the REBP to unemployed in cells where it was lower than 20%. Our estimates show that the
REBP significantly improved job search outcomes for unemployed workers in cells where com-
petition with REBP workers was the strongest: unemployed in these cells experienced a decline
in unemployment duration of 2.5 to 5 weeks relative to similar workers residing in cells with low
competition from REBP workers.
Wages The sign and magnitude of our estimated REBP market externalities suggest that
wages did not react much to outside options of eligible workers. Higher wages would have
triggered a decrease in the number of job vacancies opened by firms and would have muted
or even reversed the externalities on non-eligible workers. Here, we investigate explicitly this
question by looking at the REBP effect on reemployment wages of eligible workers.
Analyzing the REBP effect on wages is very different from our previous market externality
19High integration to REBP counties is defined as having an average quarterly fraction of new hires coming
from REBP regions in the total number of new hires above 15% for all non-REBP periods.
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analysis, as we now wish to compare eligible workers to non-eligible workers. Identification of the
effect on wages is difficult for at least three reasons. First, the REBP increases unemployment
duration for eligible workers, which may directly affect wages through duration dependence
effects. Second, REBP treatment affects the probability of entering into unemployment and
REBP recipients may therefore be selected along unobserved characteristics that are correlated
with wages. Treatment is also correlated with the probability of ever reentering the labor force,
which creates additional selection issues. Finally, the REBP affects labor market tightness,
which will in turn affect the bargaining power of workers.
Given these difficulties, our analysis remains tentative and most of the details and caveats
are discussed more extensively in appendix section D. We start by comparing eligible workers
in REBP counties and non-REBP counties. Because eligible workers in REBP counties expe-
rienced longer unemployment durations during the REBP than eligible workers in non-REBP
counties, reemployment wages of eligible workers in REBP and non-REBP counties may sim-
ply differ because of variations in the distribution of wage offers over the duration of a spell.
To control for this issue, we follow the methodology of Schmieder et al. [2012a] and estimate
the effect of variations in benefits on reemployment wages holding unemployment duration con-
stant. Identification is based on the assumption that there is no correlation between unobserved
heterogeneity and unemployment benefits conditional on unemployment duration.
We plot in appendix figure 6 post-unemployment wages conditional on the duration of the
unemployment spell in REBP and non-REBP counties for eligible workers (aged 50 to 54 with
more than 15 years of experience). The difference between REBP and non-REBP counties at
each duration point in panel B (when REBP was in place) compared to the same difference in
panel A (when REBP was not in place) gives us a diff-in-diff estimate of the REBP effect on
reemployment wages conditional on spell duration. This evidence suggests that there was no
significant REBP effect on reemployment wages.
We formally assess this result in appendix table 10 by running a simple diff-in-diff model
where we compare workers eligible to the REBP (treatment) to non-eligible workers (control).
Each panel uses a different control group. In panel A, we use workers aged 50 to 54 with more
than 15 years of experience but residing in non-REBP regions. In panel B we use workers aged
50 to 54 residing in REBP regions but with less than 15 years of experience. In panel C we
use workers aged 46 to 49 with 15 years of experience and residing in REBP regions. In our
preferred specification of column (4), we condition on the duration of unemployment using a
rich set of dummies for the duration of unemployment prior to finding a new job. Irrespective
of the control group we are using, we always find no significant REBP effect on reemployment
wages.20
20To complement our diff-in-diff approach, in appendix D we also exploit the age eligibility discontinuity at
50 and the experience eligibility discontinuity in REBP counties to estimate RD effects of the REBP extensions
controlling for the effect of duration on reemployment wages by adding a rich set of dummies for the duration of the
spell prior to finding the job. Results suggest the presence of no wage effect using the experience discontinuity,
and a small significant elasticity of wages with respect to UI benefits when using the age discontinuity. Note
however that the McCrary test strongly rejects continuity in the probability density function of age) at the cutoff
(50 years) during the REBP period, which suggests that the estimated wage effects could partly be driven by
selection (sorting) at the 50 years age cut-off.
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Overall, this evidence, although tentative, suggests that wages of eligible workers did not
strongly respond to the REBP, which is in line with the market externalities that we find. Yet,
we cannot exclude that these results are confounded by selection, nor can we exclude that wages
would have adjusted in the very long run.
6 Discussion and policy implications
Micro versus macro effects of UI extensions Our empirical findings have important policy
implications. The overall effect of a change in UI on the job finding rate (the macro effect of UI),
is the sum of the micro effect and of market externalities. The presence of significant market
externalities implies that the micro and the macro effect of UI extensions are not the same.
Estimates of the effects of UI benefits on search effort using variation in UI across individuals
within a labor market capture micro effects of UI and do not provide enough information to
assess the full welfare implications of variations in UI benefits.
Importantly, our analysis also offers direct insights on the relative magnitude of micro and
macro effects of variations in benefits in a labor market. We are interested in recovering the
wedge between micro and macro effects when changing UI for the whole labor market. This
wedge is W = 1− eM/em where eM is the total effect on job finding rate of treating the whole
market by an increase dB in UI benefits (“macro effect”) and em is the “micro effect”. This
wedge can be recovered from our two groups quasi-experimental setting (appendix A.2):
W =
1
p
dDb
dBa
dDa
dBa
− dDbdBa
(5)
The numerator dDbdBa is the effect of the REBP increase in UI, dBa, for eligible workers on the
duration of unemployment of non-eligible workers, Db, and captures REBP market externalities.
Intuitively, because the effect of REBP on non-treated workers will create externalities that are
smaller than if the whole market was treated, one needs to rescale estimated externalities in our
experiment by 1/p where p is the fraction of eligible workers in the market. The denominator is
the micro effect of REBP. It is equal to the total effect of REBP on the spell duration of eligible
workers dDadBa minus REBP externalities identified by
dDb
dBa
.
We can now calibrate the wedge W of equation (5) for the labor market of eligible 50 to 54
in REBP regions. To calibrate the numerator dDbdBa , we use the externalities estimate γ0 of table
2 column (4) for non-eligible workers aged 50 to 54: γ0 = −6.91. These non-eligible workers are
the most likely to be competing in the same labor market as eligible workers and of capturing
the full extent of externalities in this labor market. For dDadBa , we use the estimate of the full
effect of REBP on eligible workers β0 from table 2 column (4): β0 = −29.17. For p, we use the
average fraction of eligible workers among 50-54 workers in REBP regions prior to REBP ≈ .9.
This gives us a wedge of W ≈ .21.
To what extent is this wedge informative about the micro and macro effects of treating
all labor markets by having a country-wide or region-wide unemployment insurance extension?
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To answer this question, it is important to realize that, compared to a setting where all labor
markets would be treated, in the REBP setting, some untreated labor markets (for workers aged
below 50 for instance) are offering substitution opportunities to treated workers. We explain
in appendix section A.3 the consequences of the existence of substitution possibilities across
markets on the magnitude of market externalities of UI. The intuition is that when the treated
labor market is small, and the elasticity of substitution with workers from other markets is
large, then the treated market is like a small open economy: its labor market tightness is close
to infinitely elastic and set by the labor market tightness of substitution markets. Labor market
tightness in the treated market will therefore not react strongly to variations in UI for workers
in that market and market externalities of UI will be small. In other words, the more substitutes
are available for firms, the smaller the market externalities of UI in the treated market. This
suggests that the wedge between the micro and macro effects of country-wide or region-wide
UI extensions could be greater than the wedge we found in the REBP context for the treated
market of male workers aged 50 to 54.
Implications for welfare effects of UI extensions Our results bear important implications
for optimal UI policies. As explained in Landais et al. [2010], in equilibrium search and matching
models, the traditional partial equilibrium Baily-Chetty formula for the optimal level of benefits
(Chetty [2006]) needs to be extended to take into account the difference between partial equilib-
rium (micro) and macro effects of UI benefits which captures equilibrium adjustments in labor
market tightness. The reason is that, when the Hosios condition does not hold and the economy
is inefficient, UI-induced variations in labor market tightness will have first-order welfare effects
by affecting workers’ job-finding probability per unit of effort. When the economy is slack, more
UI is desirable if UI increases tightness and less UI is desirable if UI decreases tightness.
Given that we find a positive wedge between the micro and the macro effects, this implies
that more generous UI increases labor market tightness. As a consequence, the optimal level of
UI will be larger than suggested by the partial equilibrium Baily-Chetty formula. UI extensions
are less distortionary than based on estimation of micro estimates of the effects of UI.
Our results in appendix table 9 further suggest that market externalities are larger when
initial labor market tightness is low. This would imply that the wedge between micro and macro
effects is likely to be larger during recessions (low tightness) than during booms (high tightness).
This would therefore offer a natural justification for countercyclical extensions of UI on efficiency
grounds, as hypothesized in Landais et al. [2010].
Market externalities are likely to be larger in the short run. There are two potential reasons
for this. First, in the short run, returns to labor are more likely to be decreasing (capital not
being able to adjust as quickly as labor fluctuations). Second, because of various frictions in
the wage-setting process, it might take time for wages to adjust to a change in UI benefits.
Our empirical evidence nevertheless suggests that even after three to four years, positive REBP
externalities are still detectable on non-eligible workers. Because the REBP program was only
temporary, we cannot properly estimate the speed at which externalities may decrease over time.
In the long run, however, it is possible that these externalities would have decreased. First,
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because, as suggested by appendix figure 7, it seems that wages started to react more to REBP
extensions over time. Second, in the long run, labor demand is likely to become more elastic
to labor market tightness as returns to labor are more likely to become constant. Eventually,
it is even possible that externalities change sign in the long run, so that the macro effect of UI
variations becomes larger than the micro effect.21 In terms of policy implications, this means
that temporary extensions enacted in reaction to business cycles downturns are less socially
costly than previously thought. And when determining the optimal time span of temporary
extensions, governments should pay attention to the evolution of market externalities over time.
21This may explain why cross-sectional estimates comparing countries or US states tend to find much larger elas-
ticities than reform-based (short term) estimates. This may also explain why, European countries with generous
UI coverage experience high level of structural long term unemployment despite the fact that most reform-based
estimates in Europe find relatively modest elasticities in the short run.
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Figure 1: Regional distribution of REBP and local labor market integration
during non-REBP years (1980-1988 and 1998-2009)
A. Fraction of new hires from REBP regions in total number of new hires by county
REBP regions
0-5% of new hires coming from REBP regions
5-10% of new hires coming from REBP regions
10-20% of new hires coming from REBP regions
20-40% of new hires coming from REBP regions
40-100% of new hires coming from REBP regions
B. Fraction of new hires from non-REBP regions in total number of new hires by county
Non REBP regions
0-5% of new hires coming from non-REBP regions
5-10% of new hires coming from non-REBP regions
10-20% of new hires coming from non-REBP regions
20-40% of new hires coming from non-REBP regions
40-100% of new hires coming from non-REBP regions
Notes: the figure shows the distribution of REBP across the 2361 communities (counties) in Austria. The
treated regions (REBP regions) are all counties with red shading in panel B and include parts of the provinces of
Burgenland, Carinthia (Ka¨rnten), Lower Austria (Niedero¨sterreich), Upper Austria (Obero¨sterreich), and Styria
(Steiermark). Both panels also give important information about the level of local labor market integration across
REBP and non-REBP regions. Panel A maps the average quarterly fraction of men aged 46 to 54 coming from
REBP regions in the total number of new hires of men aged 46 to 54 in non-REBP counties for all years when
the REBP was not in place. The map shows that the degree of competition from REBP workers faced by
workers in non-REBP counties is very small, except for a few counties close to the border. To make sure our
control and treatment regions are isolated labor markets we remove from our estimation sample the few counties
with more than 5% of new hires coming from REBP regions. Panel B maps the average quarterly fraction of men
aged 46 to 54 coming from non-REBP regions in the total number of new hires of men aged 46 to 54 in REBP
counties for all years when the REBP was not in place. This measures the degree of competition from
non-REBP workers faced by workers in REBP counties. The map shows that this competition is relatively small
except for a few counties close to the REBP border.
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Figure 2: Evaluating the degree of competition for identical vacancies between
REBP eligible workers and different groups of non-eligible workers:
A. Goodness-of-fit tests
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Notes:This figure reports various goodness-of-fit measures of a logit model where the REBP-eligibility status of the worker filling a vacancy
is explained by all the characteristics of the vacancy. We estimate this model separately for different groups of non-eligible workers against
eligible workers. A good fit of the model indicates that non-eligible workers fill vacancies that are very different from the vacancies filled by
eligible workers. A poor goodness-of-fit indicates that eligible and non-eligible workers fill vacancies that have very similar characteristics. In
panel A, we plot the p-value of two standard goodness-of-fit tests for the logit model, the Pearson’s χ2 goodness of fit test and the Hosmer-
Lemeshow χ2 goodness of fit test. A low p-value indicates poor fit and low predictive value of the model. In panel B, we plot the fraction
of observations that are misclassified by our model (the predicted status is different from the true status of the worker filling the vacancy).
We also plot the fraction of type I errors of the model. The classification error measures of panel B should be interpreted with caution as
classification is sensitive to the relative sizes of each group of workers. We therefore tend to prefer goodness-of-fit measures presented in panel
A. All the details are given in the online appendix section B.
Figure 3: Difference in unemployment durations between REBP and non-REBP
counties by year of entry into unemployment:
A. Eligible unemployed
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C. Non-eligible unemployed above 50
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Notes: The figure plots dt, the yearly average difference in unemployment duration (in weeks) between REBP and non-REBP counties,
obtained from regression specification 2, where controls include education, 15 industry codes, family status, citizenship and tenure in previous
job. The reference year is 1981. Standard errors cluster at the region × year level. Sample includes all unemployed individuals between 46
and 54 in REBP and non-REBP counties. Non-REBP counties with high labor market integration to REBP regions are excluded from the
sample. Panel A plots the difference for workers above 50 with more than 15 years of work history in the past 25 years prior to becoming
unemployed, who are therefore eligible for REBP. Panel B plots the difference for all non-eligible workers (less than 50 and/or less than 15
years of work history). Panel C plots the difference for non-eligible workers based on work history only (above 50 but less than continuous 15
years of work history). See text for details.
Figure 4: Unemployment durations as a function of age in REBP and non-REBP
counties for non-eligible unemployed:
A. Before and after REBP
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B. During peak of REBP (1992-1995)
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Notes: the figure plots the relationship between age and unemployment durations for all non-eligible workers in REBP and non-REBP counties
when REBP was not in place (panel A), and during the peak of the REBP period (January 1992 to December 1995). We plot the average
duration of unemployment in bins of age at the start of unemployment where the bin size is two months of age. In REBP counties, to make
the distinction more visible between non-eligible workers due to age (below 50) and due to work experience only (age 50 to 54), we plot
them in different marker shapes. We fit the data with a third-order polynomial for REBP and non-REBP counties. Panel A shows that
during the non-REBP period, the relationship between age and unemployment duration is extremely similar for non-eligible workers in REBP
and non-REBP regions. Panel B shows that during the peak of the REBP period (January 1992 to December 1995) non-eligible workers
experienced shorter unemployment spells in REBP regions compared to non-REBP regions. And this difference in unemployment duration is
sharply increasing with age.
Table 1: Summary statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
A. REBP vs non-REBP counties
Non-REBP period REBP period
Non-REBP REBP Non-REBP REBP
counties counties Difference p-value counties counties Difference p-value
Fraction employed in the steel sector .055 .152 -.097 0 .057 .156 -.099 0
Monthly 46-54 unemployment rate .055 .054 .001 .864 .073 .113 -.04 0
Fraction eligible to REBP .382 .396 -.014 0 .449 .533 -.084 0
Age 49.7 49.7 0 .343 49.8 50.1 -.3 0
Unemployment duration 13.6 14.3 -.7 0 15.9 29 -13.1 0
Non employment duration 22.7 21.2 1.4 0 32.9 45.4 -12.4 0
Wage before U spell (e2000) 13448 14306 -857 0 13122 14498 -1375 0
B. Eligible vs non-eligible unemployed in REBP counties
Non-REBP period REBP period
Non-eligible Eligible Non-eligible Eligible
unemployed unemployed Difference p-value unemployed unemployed Difference p-value
Age 48.2 51.9 -3.7 0 48 52 -4 0
Unemployment duration 17.5 20.8 -3.2 0 23.2 88.8 -65.6 0
Non employment duration 21.6 24.7 -3.1 0 31.4 99.6 -68.2 0
Wage before U spell (e2000) 14096 14623 -527 0 13316 15549 -2232 0
Fraction with compulsory education .529 .501 .028 0 .511 .506 .005 .44
Fraction married .744 .751 -.007 .076 .748 .803 -.055 0
Notes: The table displays summary statistics from the Austrian social security and unemployment insurance files. Panel A compares REBP and non-REBP counties in the non-REBP period (1980 to May 1988 and
August 1997 to 2009) and during the REBP period (June 1988 to July 1997). P-value is for a test of equality of means for REBP and non-REBP counties. The fraction of employment in the steel sector is defined
as the average quarterly fraction of individuals aged 46 to 54 employed in the steel industry. The unemployment rate is the average monthly number of unemployed men aged 46 to 54 recorded in the unemployment
insurance files as a fraction of the sum of unemployed and employed male workers aged 46 to 54. All remaining rows in this table are computed for our estimation sample of unemployed workers which is restricted to
men, aged 46 to 54, who never work in the steel sector. Panel B compares, in REBP counties, in the non-REBP period (1980 to May 1988 and August 1997 to 2009) and during the REBP period (June 1988 to July
1997), eligible unemployed workers (above 50 and with more than 15 years of continuous work history in the past 25 years) to non-eligible unemployed workers (with less than 15 years of continuous work history in the
past 25 years or below 50). P-value is for a test of equality of means for these two groups. All duration outcomes are expressed in weeks. Wages are annually adjusted and expressed in constant e2000. Non-employment
is defined as the number of weeks between two employment spells. Unemployment duration is the duration of paid unemployment recorded in the UI administrative data.
Table 2: Baseline estimates of the treatment effect of REBP on eligible unem-
ployed and non-eligible unemployed
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Unemployment duration Non-empl. Spell Spell
duration >100 wks >26 wks
A. Treatment effect on eligible unemployed
β0 47.13
∗∗∗ 43.35∗∗∗ 43.37∗∗∗ 29.17∗∗∗ 0.240∗∗∗ 0.237∗∗∗
(5.602) (5.129) (5.069) (5.444) (0.0293) (0.0240)
N 267966 262344 262344 232135 262344 262344
B. Externality - all non-eligible unemployed
γ0 -2.462
∗∗∗ -1.979∗∗∗ -3.740∗∗∗ -2.327∗∗∗ -0.0130∗∗∗ -0.0165∗∗
(0.818) (0.708) (0.758) (0.629) (0.00311) (0.00660)
N 267966 262344 262344 232135 262344 262344
C. Externality - non-eligible unemployed below 50
γ0 -2.004
∗∗ -1.446∗∗ -3.321∗∗∗ -2.030∗∗∗ -0.0104∗∗∗ -0.0166∗∗∗
(0.829) (0.699) (0.616) (0.539) (0.00205) (0.00526)
N 254934 249894 249894 220754 249894 249894
D. Externality - non-eligible unemployed above 50
γ0 -6.638
∗∗∗ -6.124∗∗∗ -8.862∗∗∗ -6.913∗∗∗ -0.0244∗∗∗ -0.0494∗∗∗
(2.156) (2.194) (2.226) (2.100) (0.00915) (0.0142)
N 125088 122277 122277 102677 122277 122277
Educ., industry,
citizenship, × × × × ×
marital status
Region-specific × × × ×
trends
Notes: S.e. clustered at the year×region level in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.010.
All duration outcomes are expressed in weeks. The table presents estimates of the model presented in equation
(3). β0 identifies the effect of REBP on eligible unemployed, while γ0 identifies spillovers of REBP on non-eligible
unemployed in REBP counties. In column (1), we estimate this model without any other controls. In column (2)
we add a vector of controls X which includes education, 15 industry codes, family status, citizenship and tenure
in previous job. In column (3) to (6) we add controls for preexisting trends by region. Panel A presents the effect
of REBP on labor market outcomes of eligible workers. Panel B presents the effect of REBP on labor market
outcomes of all non-eligible workers aged 46 to 54. In panel C, we focus on the effect of REBP for non-eligible
workers age 46 to 50 who are non-eligible based on age. For this specification, we exclude from the estimation
sample non-eligible workers based on experience. Panel D shows the effect of REBP for non-eligible workers age
50 or above who are non-eligible based on the experience requirement. For this specification, we exclude from the
estimation sample workers with age below 50.
Table 3: Testing for selection: impact of REBP on inflow rate into unemploy-
ment, log real wage in previous job and log tenure in previous job of eligible
and non-eligible unemployed
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
log separation log real wage log tenure
rate in previous job in previous job
Eligible workers 0.286***
(0.0356)
Non-eligible workers 0.0162
(0.0218)
β0 (REBP effect on eligible) 0.109 0.128* 0.646*** 0.487***
(0.0688) (0.0686) (0.0767) (0.0563)
γ0 (REBP effect on non-eligible) 0.0110 -0.00873 -0.0450 -0.0581*
(0.0112) (0.0108) (0.0355) (0.0305)
Educ., marital status,
industry, citizenship × ×
N 3390 240947 240923 267929 267901
Notes: For columns (2) to (5), standard errors are clustered at the year×region level. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***
p<0.010. The table investigates the presence of selection effects of the REBP program affecting the distribution
of unobserved characteristics of non-eligible workers in REBP regions. Column (1) presents the diff-in-diff effect
of the REBP program on the quarterly log separation rate of eligible and non-eligible workers in REBP regions
compared to non-REBP regions. In this column, observations are at the eligibility group×region×quarter level.
In columns (2) to (5), sample include all unemployed age 46 to 54. Columns (2) and (3) present specifications
similar to that of table 2 but where the outcome variable is the log wage in the previous job prior to becoming
unemployed. Columns (4) and (5) repeat the same regressions using the log tenure in previous job as an outcome.
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Table 4: Externalities on non-eligible unemployed by REBP-treatment intensity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unemployment Non-empl. Spell Spell
REBP effect on non-treated duration duration >100 wks >26 wks
A. Treatment intensity - Method 1:
County share of hires from non-REBP counties
All non-eligible
γL0 (share of non-REBP hires > .05) -1.599** -0.676 -0.00275 -0.00289
(0.747) (0.693) (0.00224) (0.00661)
γH0 (share of non-REBP hires ≤ .05) -2.866*** -4.170*** -0.00612* -0.0266***
(0.844) (0.917) (0.00324) (0.00733)
F-Test γL0 = γ
H
0 [0.0674] [0.0001] [0.138] [0.0002]
Non-eligible 50+
γL0 (share of non-REBP hires > .05) -4.048** -4.191* -0.00300 -0.0119
(1.894) (2.309) (0.00788) (0.0136)
γH0 (share of non-REBP hires ≤ .05) -15.24*** -10.66* -0.0519** -0.111***
(5.164) (5.831) (0.0230) (0.0372)
F-Test γL0 = γ
H
0 [0.0245] [0.310] [0.0354] [0.00566]
B. Treatment intensity - Method 2:
Fraction treated in region×education×industry cell
All non-eligible
γL0 (fraction treated ≤ .9) -0.849 -1.022 0.00426 -0.00918
(0.933) (1.161) (0.00421) (0.00886)
γH0 (fraction treated > .9 ) -2.238*** -1.908** -0.00560* -0.0102
(0.828) (0.802) (0.00307) (0.00725)
F-Test γL0 = γ
H
0 [0.252] [0.545] [0.104] [0.928]
Non-eligible 50+
γL0 (fraction treated ≤ .9) -4.207 -3.661 -0.00126 -0.0351*
(2.807) (2.378) (0.0110) (0.0188)
γH0 (fraction treated > .9) -8.831*** -8.022*** -0.0274*** -0.0235
(2.016) (2.426) (0.00952) (0.0215)
F-Test γL0 = γ
H
0 [0.0789] [0.0503] [0.0272] [0.668]
Educ., marital status,
industry, citizenship × × × ×
Notes: S.e. clustered at the year×region level in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010.
Sample restricted to male workers working in non-steel related sectors. All duration outcomes are expressed in weeks.
The table presents estimates of the effects of REBP on non-eligible workers broken down by REBP-treatment intensity.
The estimated specification is that of equation (4). γH0 identifies spillovers of REBP on non-treated workers in high
REBP-treatment intensity regions, γL0 identifies spillovers of REBP on non-treated workers in low REBP-treatment
intensity regions. We use two methods to characterize treatment intensity. Method 1 computes the average quarterly
fraction of new hires coming from non-REBP counties for each REBP county when the REBP was not in place and we
define high treatment intensity counties as counties where the fraction of new hires coming from non-REBP counties is
lower than 5%, which corresponds to the median value across REBP counties. Method 2 computes the average yearly
fraction of eligible workers among the 50+ for each region×industry×education cell during REBP years and we define
high treatment intensity as being in a cell where more than 90% of the 50+ unemployed were eligible, which is the
median value across all region×industry×education cells. A region is defined as the first two digits of the municipality
identifiers.
Table 5: Geographical spillovers: Effect of REBP on unemployed workers in
non-REBP counties with high labor market integration to REBP counties
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Unemployment Non-empl. Spell Spell
duration duration >100 wks >26 wks
Labor market integration - Measure 1:
Fraction of hires coming from REBP regions
in county cell
γ0 (geographical spillovers) -3.997*** -3.500** -1.043 -0.00658 -0.0239**
(1.428) (1.440) (1.439) (0.00558) (0.0119)
Labor market integration - Measure 2:
Fraction of hires coming from REBP regions
in county×industry×education cell
γ0 (geographical spillovers) -6.373*** -5.242*** -2.515*** -0.0141*** -0.0169***
(1.213) (1.109) (0.659) (0.00368) (0.00603)
Educ., marital status,
industry, citizenship × × × ×
N 104881 102840 88702 102840 102840
Notes: S.e. clustered at the year×region level in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010.
Sample restricted to male workers aged 50-54 working in non-steel related sectors with more than 15 years of
experience in the past 25 years prior to becoming unemployed. All duration outcomes are expressed in weeks.
The table presents estimates of a simple diff-in-diff specification comparing unemployed workers in non-REBP
counties with high integration to REBP counties versus unemployed workers in non-REBP counties with low level
of integration as a control. In panel A, counties with high level of labor market integration are defined as counties
with an average quarterly fraction of new hires coming from REBP regions in total number of new hires above
15% for all years when REBP was not in place. In panel B, we use a finer measure of labor market integration
by looking at county×industry×education cells, and we compare unemployed workers in cells where the average
fraction of hires from REBP counties in total yearly hires was larger than 20% (for all years when REBP was not
in place) to unemployed in cells where it was lower than 20%.
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A Externalities in search and matching models and their iden-
tification
The probability that an individual finds a job in a given time period t depends on how hard
that individual searches for a job and/or on how selective he is in his acceptance decisions. It
also depends on the aggregate labor market conditions that determine how easy it is to locate
jobs or to be matched to a potential employer for each unit of search effort. These two forces
are usually represented in equilibrium search and matching models by using the stylized decom-
position: hit = eit · f(θt). h is the hazard rate out of unemployment (the probability to find a
job in period t for individual i). eit captures the search effort / selectiveness component. θt is
the ratio of job vacancies to total search effort, and represents the tightness of the labor market.
f(θt) therefore captures the effect of labor market conditions on the job finding probability per
unit of effort. If there are no job vacancies created by employers, then f(θt) = 0 and no amount
of search effort by an unemployed worker would yield a positive probability of obtaining a job.
Changes in unemployment benefit policies affect the search intensity /selectiveness of un-
employed workers. We call this effect the micro effect of UI. It can be identified by comparing
two individuals with different levels of UI generosity in the same labor market. Changes in
unemployment benefit policies also affect the aggregate job finding rate per unit of search effort
through equilibrium effects. We call this second effect market externalities. It stems from equi-
librium adjustments in labor market tightness θt in response to a change in UI generosity. The
first aim of this appendix is to provide a simple theoretical framework explaining the mechanisms
shaping the sign and magnitude of these market externalities. The second aim is to explain how
to identify these market externalities empirically.
We start by presenting a one group equilibrium to explain the forces shaping equilibrium
adjustments in labor market tightness in response to variations in UI. Then we extend the model
to a two-group equilibrium in order to explain how to identify market externalities empirically
and connect more closely the framework to the policy experiment that we analyze in the paper.
In particular, we detail how to choose groups of workers to identify market externalities. We
also explain how the sign and magnitude of market externalities depend on the structure of the
labor market treated by the change in UI generosity and its connection to other labor markets.
The representation of the labor market that we use was developed by Michaillat [2012]. It is
also strongly related to Landais et al. [2010], where search effort is endogeneized and unemploy-
ment insurance is introduced in the model of Michaillat [2012]. Readers are referred to these
two papers for further details on the set-up and equilibrium analysis.
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A.1 One group equilibrium
The labor market is characterized by the presence of matching frictions. We normalize the size
of labor force to unity. We present a simplified, static equilibrium analysis of search and match-
ing models and characterize the comparative static for steady state equilibria. To keep things
simple, we assume throughout that all workers within a group get the same wage. We start by
looking at a one group equilibrium, as in Landais et al. [2010], where all workers are eligible
to the same unemployment benefits B, and explain the two main mechanisms that shape the
equilibrium response in labor market tightness to a variation in unemployment benefits: the rat
race effect (or labor demand effect) and the wage effect.
Unemployed workers face v vacancies opened by firms, and the total number of matches re-
alized is given by an aggregate matching function m(e · u, v) = ωm · (e · u)η · v1−η. Labor market
tightness θ = ve·u is defined as the ratio of vacancies to the aggregate search effort in the labor
market.
The individual job-finding probability is h = e · f(θ) = e · m(1, θ), where e = e(B, θ) is
the optimal search effort of individuals given benefits and labor market tightness. Effort is a
decreasing function of unemployment benefits ∂e/∂B < 0. To further simplify the presentation,
we assume that ∂e∂θ = 0. The assumption that the elasticity of job search effort with respect
to the job-finding rate is close to zero seems reasonable empirically. As emphasized by Shimer
[2004] labor market participation and other measures of search intensity are, if anything, slightly
countercyclical even after controlling for changing characteristics of unemployed workers over
the business cycle. The job-finding probability is an increasing function of θ (f ′(θ) > 0). From
the definition of the matching function we can also define the vacancy-filling probability for each
vacancy opened by the firm q(θ) = m(1/θ, 1) which is a decreasing function of labor market
tightness ∂q(θ)∂θ < 0.
We denote by ns the probability that a worker is employed (and by u = 1 − ns the cor-
responding unemployment probability). Using the steady state equality of flows in and out of
unemployment, we have that
ns =
ef(θ)
λ+ ef(θ)
(6)
where λ is the exogenous separation rate. Following Michaillat [2012], we interpret ns =
ns(θ, e(B)) as a labor supply that we can represent as an increasing function of θ in a {n, θ}
diagram.
A representative firm maximizes profit pi = φ(n) − n · w − rq(θ) · ψ · n where φ(.) is total
output, n is employment and r is the recruiting cost of opening a vacancy. Firms take labor
market tightness as given, and for them it is equivalent to choose employment level or the
number of vacancies, given that v vacancies automatically translate into v · q(θ) job creations.
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The first-order condition of the firm with respect to employment level n is:
φ′(n) = w +
rψ
q(θ)
(7)
Equation (7) implicitly defines a labor demand function nd(θ, w) whose properties depend in
particular on the assumptions made on φ(.) and on the wage setting process defining w. These
properties are important to determine the sign and magnitude of externalities, as explained
below. In particular, note that when technology exhibits diminishing returns to labor, with
φ′(n) > 0 and φ′′(n) < 0, we have by implicit differentiation of equation (7): ∂n
d
∂θ < 0. So in
this case, labor demand will be a downward sloping function of θ as in Michaillat [2012]. The
intuition for this negative relationship between labor demand and labor market tightness is the
following: as labor market tightness goes up, the cost of opening vacancies goes up, as it takes
longer to fill vacancies. Firms will post fewer vacancies, bringing their level of employment
down, which will increase labor productivity and restore the profit from opening vacancies. It
is also immediate to see that when technology is linear and in the absence of aggregate demand
effects, equation (7) implicitly defines labor demand as a perfectly elastic function of labor mar-
ket tightness.
Note also that, depending on the wage setting process, labor demand implicitly defined by
equation (7) can also be a function of unemployment benefits. If wages are bargained over and
workers have limited bargaining power, then wages will react to outside options of workers and
thus to variations in unemployment benefits B: w = w(B). As can be seen from equation (7),
an increase in B leading to a increase in wages w will, everything else equal, decrease the net
return from opening a vacancy and lead to a decrease in labor demand nd.
We can now define a labor market equilibrium by the condition:
ns(θ, e(B)) = nd(θ, w(B)) (8)
Market externalities:
Equilibrium condition (8) defines θ as an endogenous variable, affected by the level of benefits
B of unemployed individuals in equilibrium. Because of this equilibrium adjustment of θ in
response to a change in UI benefits, the effect of UI on the job finding probability h = e · f(θ)
can be decomposed into two parts, a micro-effect capturing the change in search effort keeping
labor market tightness constant and a “market externality”, capturing the effect of the change
in labor market tightness:
dh
dB
=
d(e · f(θ))
dB
=
∂e
∂B
· f(θ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Micro effect
+
Market externality︷ ︸︸ ︷
e · f ′(θ) · θ
B
· εθB (9)
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where εθB =
dθ
dB
B
θ is the elasticity of labor market tightness with respect to the generosity of
UI B. The second term on the right-hand side of equation (9) is the market externality, which
is defined as the variation in the job finding rate caused by equilibrium adjustments in labor
market tightness, keeping search effort constant.
The reason why we call this effect a “market externality” instead of a mere incidence effect
is because, as shown in Landais et al. [2010], these equilibrium adjustments in labor market
tightness have first-order welfare effects when the Hosios condition is not met.
Equilibrium adjustment of θ in response to a change in UI benefits ( dθdB ) is given by fully
differentiating equation (8).
dθ
dB
=
∂nd
∂w
∂w
∂B − ∂n
s
∂B
∂ns
∂θ − ∂n
d
∂θ
(10)
Equation (10) can also be rewritten in terms of elasticities:
εθB =
εn
d
w · εwB − εn
s
B
εn
s
θ − εn
d
θ
(11)
where the notation εXY refers to the elasticity of X w.r.t Y . From the previous equation, we
can now discuss the forces determining equilibrium adjustments of θ in response to a change in
benefits B. We focus in particular on two opposing forces: the rat-race effect (or labor-demand
effect), and the wage effect.
Rate race effect
The rate race effect is determined by the elasticity of labor-demand (εn
d
θ ). If labor demand
is downward sloping (εn
d
θ < 0) then the denominator in (11) is positive. Given that ε
ns
B < 0,
it follows that, conditional on wages, equilibrium labor market tightness will increase when UI
benefits increase εθB
∣∣
w
> 0. The more inelastic labor demand is with respect to labor market
tightness, the larger the rat race effect. If labor demand is fixed, then the rat race effect is at its
maximum: firms will fully compensate a UI-induced decrease in search effort by opening more
vacancies to keep the level of employment constant.
Intuitively, a downward sloping labor demand (εn
d
θ < 0) captures the fact that the net profits
from opening vacancies are a decreasing function of employment. When search effort decreases,
it decreases labor supply, which increases the profits of opening vacancies for firms: vacancies
increase, which increases labor market tightness, and the probability of finding a job per unit of
effort increases for all workers. Landais et al. [2010] discuss various search and matching models
and show under which conditions such “rat race” effect is likely to arise. In particular, Landais
et al. [2010] show that technology can be an important factor. In the presence of diminishing
returns to labor, as explained above, labor demand is a downward sloping function of tightness
and the larger the diminishing returns to labor, the larger the labor demand effect on equilibrium
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tightness. When technology is close to linear in labor, labor demand will in general be close
to perfectly elastic, and therefore εθB tends to zero. Note however that diminishing returns is a
sufficient but not a necessary condition for the presence of a downward sloping labor demand.
Landais et al. [2010] show for instance that an “aggregate demand model” with a quantity equa-
tion for money and nominal wage rigidities will feature a downward sloping labor demand even
with linear technology.
The rat race effect will be the only driver of labor market tightness adjustments to the policy
when wages do not react to the policy (εwB = 0). Studies estimating spillover effects of active
labor market programs such as training programs therefore tend to capture a pure rat race effect
as these training programs do not generally affect bargained wages.
Wage effect
If the wage setting process is such that wages depend on outside options of workers, then an
increase in UI benefits will increase wages εwB > 0, which will in turn affect the vacancy posting
behavior of firms. Higher wages will decrease the return from opening vacancies for firms leading
to a decrease in labor demand (εn
d
w < 0) and in turn, a decrease in labor market tightness. We
call this effect the wage effect (or job creation effect). The wage effect is going in the opposite
direction to the rate race effect. The overall effect of a change in UI benefits on equilibrium
labor market tightness will therefore depend on the relative magnitude of these two effects. If
the wage effect is large enough, the numerator in (11) may become negative (εn
d
w · εwB < εn
s
B < 0)
and equilibrium labor market tightness will decrease in response to an increase in benefits. If
the wage effect is small in magnitude, then the rat race effect will dominate: the numerator in
(11) will be positive (εn
s
B < ε
nd
w · εwB < 0) and labor market tightness will increase in response to
an increase in UI benefits.
A.2 Identification of market externalities in a two group equilibrium
Identification of the micro effect in equation (9) is relatively straightforward. The ideal ex-
periment is to offer higher unemployment benefits to a randomly selected and small subset of
individuals within a labor market and compare unemployment durations between these treated
individuals and the other jobseekers. In practice, the micro effect is estimated by comparing
individuals with different benefits in the same labor market at a given time, while controlling
for individual characteristics.
Identification of market externalities in equation (9) is more complicated, in large part due
to the lack of good measures of labor market tightness.22 We show here how one can use la-
22A notable exception is Marinescu [2014] who uses very detailed information on vacancies and job applications
from CareerBuilder.com, the largest American online job board, to compute the effects of UI extensions on
aggregate search effort (e · u) measured by job applications and on vacancy posting (v) at the state level. She
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bor market outcomes of different group of workers in the same labor market to identify market
externalities of UI benefits. We introduce two groups of workers a and b and assume there are
p workers of group a who are eligible to unemployment benefits Ba and 1 − p workers workers
of group b who are eligible to unemployment benefit Bb. The group shares p and 1 − p are
exogenously given. We start from a situation where Ba = Bb and look at the effect on the
steady state equilibrium of an increase in benefits for workers of group a: dBa > 0.
We denote by nsa (resp. n
s
b) the probability that a worker of group a (resp. b) is employed (and
by ua = 1−nsa the corresponding unemployment probability) There are u = ua+ub unemployed
workers. When unemployed, each individual worker exerts some effort ei = e(Bi), i = (a, b),
where e is a decreasing function of benefits received B.
Workers of both groups are assumed to be in the same labor market and we define a labor
market as the place where workers compete for the same job vacancies. A labor
market is therefore characterized by a unique labor market tightness in equilibrium, and match-
ing is random between identical job vacancies posted by firms and all the (potentially different)
workers who apply for these identical vacancies. From the firms’ point of view, this means that
when opening vacancies, firms take as given labor supply of group a and group b, and opening
v vacancies translates into p · na/q(θ) jobs of workers from group a and (1 − p)nb/q(θ) jobs of
workers from group b. Wages are determined at the individual level, once the match is done and
depends on the outside option of each worker. We therefore allow for two different wage levels
wa and wb for both groups of workers in equilibrium.
This definition of labor market is the most natural definition from a search theoretic stand-
point. As labor market tightness (and not the wage rate) is the “price” variable equating labor
supply and labor demand in labor market characterized by search frictions, our definition of
a labor market strictly follows the law of one price. From an empirical perspective, this defi-
nition captures the fact that a labor market is the place where workers compete for the same jobs.
As in the one group case before, firms choose the level of employment that maximizes profits,
which is equivalent to choosing the number of vacancies to open in order to maximize profits
(taking labor market tightness as given). There is only one labor market tightness for the two
groups of workers, so opening v vacancies translates into p · na/q(θ) jobs of workers from group
a and (1− p) · nb/q(θ) jobs of workers from group b. We can therefore write firms profits as:
pi = φ
(
p · na, (1− p) · nb
)
− p · na · wa − (1− p) · nb · wb − r
q(θ)
· ψ · (p · na + (1− p) · nb) (12)
finds a negative effect of UI extensions on job applications but no effect of UI extensions on vacancy posting.
Since θ = v/(e · u), these results imply that more generous UI benefits increase labor market tightness.
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p{
∂φ
∂na
− wa − rψ
q(θ)
}
+ (1− p)
{
∂φ
∂nb
− wb − rψ
q(θ)
}
= 0 (13)
Similarly to equation (7), equation (13) implicitly defines the optimal employment level de-
manded by firms as a function of labor market tightness θ. Importantly, equation (13) defines
the optimal employment level nd = pnda + (1 − p)ndb as a weighted sum of the optimal employ-
ment level of workers of group a and group b. In other words, the labor demand curve in the
two-group case is the weighted sum of the demand curve for workers of group a and the demand
curve for workers of group b.
Equilibrium in the labor market is now defined by the following condition:
pnda(θ, wa) + (1− p)ndb(θ, wb) = pnsa(θ,Ba) + (1− p)nsb(θ,Bb) (14)
Equilibrium condition (14) defines θ as an endogenous variable, affected by the level of benefits
Ba and Bb of both groups of unemployed individuals in equilibrium. Let us start from a situation
where Ba = Bb = B and workers of both groups are identical so that ea = eb, and investigate
the effect of a small change dBa > 0 on hazard rates of workers of group a and group b. Because
of the equilibrium adjustment of θ in response to a change in UI benefits Ba, the effect of UI
on the job finding probability of workers of group a, ea · f(θ) can again be decomposed into
two parts, a micro-effect capturing the change in search effort of workers of group a keeping
labor market tightness constant and a “market externality”, capturing the effect of the change
in labor market tightness:
dha
dBa
=
d(ea · f(θ))
dBa
=
∂ea
∂Ba
· f(θ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Micro effect
+
Market externality︷ ︸︸ ︷
ea · f ′(θ) · θ
B
· εθBa (15)
But workers of group b also experience a change in their job finding probability, even if their
unemployment benefits are unaffected, due to the equilibrium adjustment of θ in response to a
change in UI benefits Ba:
dhb
dBa
=
d(eb · f(θ))
dBa
= eb · f ′(θ) · θ
B
· εθBa (16)
Equation (16) shows that the effect of a change in benefits Ba for a treated group of workers on
the job finding probability of non-treated workers of group b identifies the market externality.
This result motivates our empirical strategy. By looking at how the job finding probability of
non-treated workers varies in response to a change in unemployment benefits of similar work-
ers in the same labor market, one can identify equilibrium adjustments in labor market tightness.
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We now explain how market externalities in the two group experiment relate to market
externalities in the one group experiment where all workers of the labor market are treated.
Equilibrium adjustments in tightness in the two group experiment is given by implicitly differ-
entiating equilibrium condition (14):
dθ
dBa
= p
∂nda
∂wa
∂wa
∂Ba
− ∂nsa∂Ba
∂ns
∂θ − ∂n
d
∂θ
(17)
When we start from na = nb, we can rewrite equation (17) in terms of elasticities:
εθBa = p ·
ε
nda
w · εwaBa − ε
nsa
Ba
εn
s
θ − εn
d
θ
= p · εθB (18)
A few points are worth noting about equation (18). First, equilibrium adjustments in labor
market tightness in the two group experiment increase with the size of the treated group. The
larger p, the larger the market externalities. Second, as p tends to 1, εθBa tends to ε
θ
B, so that
market externalities identified on group b will tend to capturing the effect of treating the en-
tire labor market. Third, market externalities identified through the change in the job finding
probability of workers of group b still capture the wage effect even if wages are bargained at the
individual level. The intuition is that within a labor market, there is random matching. The
expected profit of opening vacancies is the weighted average of the profits of opening vacancies
for each group of workers. Therefore the increase in bargained wages of workers of group a will
reduce the expected profit of opening vacancies and will then affect overall vacancy posting in
the market. Finally, the above have assumed that the two types of workers were perfectly equiv-
alent and initially earn the same wage. In that case, the firm’s profit-maximizing employment
level does not depend on the mix of workers. If there is imperfect substitution and/or the two
types of workers get initially different wages, employment depends on the mix of workers of both
types in equilibrium. An extra term kicks in in formula 17. Graphically, the labor demand curve
shifts as result of an increase in Ba.
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In figure 5, we offer a graphical representation of market externalities of UI extensions in the
two group model, and we illustrate how different assumptions about the production function and
the wage setting process affect the sign and magnitude of externalities. Both panels describe the
effect on labor market equilibrium of a change in benefits for one group of workers (group a),
when firms cannot discriminate vacancies between the two groups of workers. In both panel, we
23Note that the direction of the labor-demand shift is a priori unclear. An increase in Ba may change the
employment mix such that opening up new vacancies may in fact be profitable for the firm (shifting labor demand
to the right). To see this, consider the simple case when workers are perfect substitutes but initially group a gets
a higher wage than group b. When an increase in Ba strongly decreases labor supply of group a but does not
affect wages of group a, the expected wages costs of a randomly matched worker will decrease, thus firms will
increase employment. However, these effects are second order as labor demand is affected only indirectly through
the impact of Ba on n
s
a.
Figure 5: Market externalities of UI extensions in an equilibrium search-and-
matching model with two groups of workers:
A. Rigid wages & diminishing returns
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Notes: Both panels describe the effect on labor market equilibrium of a change in benefits for one group of workers
(group a), when firms cannot discriminate vacancies between the two groups of workers. In both panel, we start
from equilibrium E1, where all workers get the same UI benefits. A group of workers then receives a higher level
of benefits, which shifts their labor supply to the left. The new aggregate labor supply is a weighted average of
labor supply of both groups, depicted by the dashed red line. In case of rigid wages (panel A) as in the model of
Michaillat [2012], labor demand is not affected, and, if returns to labor are decreasing, the new equilibrium E2 is
characterized by higher labor market tightness θ∗2 and positive market externalities on workers of group b. When
wages adjust to the change in benefits (panel B), firms reduce their vacancy openings, and if returns to labor are
almost constant, it can lead to a decline in θ and negative externalities on workers of group b.
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start from equilibrium E1, where all workers get the same UI benefits. Workers of group a then
receive a higher level of benefits, which shifts their labor supply to the left. The new aggregate
labor supply is a weighted average of labor supply of both groups, depicted by the dashed red
line. In case of rigid wages (panel A) as in the model of Michaillat [2012], labor demand is
not affected, and, if returns to labor are decreasing, the new equilibrium E2 is characterized by
higher labor market tightness θ∗2 and positive market externalities on workers of group b. When
wages adjust to the change in benefits (panel B), firms reduce their vacancy openings, and if
returns to labor are almost constant, it can lead to a decline in θ and negative externalities on
workers of group b.
Implications for the wedge between micro and macro effects of UI
We are interested in recovering from the two group experiment, the wedge between micro
and macro effects of treating the whole labor market. More specifically, starting from equation
(9), we are interested in the wedge W = 1 − eM/em where eM = dhdB is the total effect on job
finding rate of treating the whole market by an increase dB in UI benefits (“macro effect”) and
em is the “micro effect” from equation (9) (i.e. the effect of an increase dB in UI benefits on
individual job finding rate).
From equation (9) we know that W = e
X
em , where e
X = e · f ′(θ) · θB · εθB is the market
externality of treating the whole labor market. From equations (16) and (18), we know that in
the two group experiments, starting from a situation where both groups have the same benefits
and search effort
dhb
dBa
= p · eX (19)
In other words, the effect of changing benefits for workers of group a on the job finding rates
of workers of group b identifies p times the externality of treating all workers, where p is the
fraction of workers of group a in the labor market.
In the two group experiment, again starting from a situation where both groups have the
same benefits and search effort, we also know that the micro effect em will be the same than
when treating the whole market. This means that the micro effect ∂e∂B · f(θ) from equation (9)
is equal to the micro effect from equation (15): ∂ea∂Ba · f(θ). And from equations (15) and (16),
we know that the micro effect will be identified in the two group experiment as
em =
dha
dBa
− dhb
dBa
(20)
In other words, the micro effect is identified by the effect of the change in UI benefits on the job
finding rate of workers of group a minus the effect on the job finding rate of workers of group b.
It follows from equations (19) and (20) that we can identify the wedge W of treating the whole
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market in the two group experiment:
W =
1
p
·
dhb
dBa
dha
dBa
− dhbdBa
(21)
Using the fact that we start from a situation where Ba = Bb and ha = hb, and under the
approximation that hazard rates are somewhat constant over a spell so that the duration of
unemployment D ≈ 1/h we can rewrite equation 21 in terms of responses of unemployment
duration:
W =
1
p
·
dDb
dBa
dDa
dBa
− dDbdBa
(22)
A.3 Market externalities across labor markets
In most quasi-experiments involving variations in the generosity of unemployment benefits, treat-
ment is restricted to some but not all labor markets. The REBP program is no exception. The
program extended the duration of UI benefits for individuals above age 50 in specific regions
meeting specific criteria. A firms can adjust to the policy not only by changing the number of
vacancy it opens in the treated labor market, but also by changing the number of vacancies it
opens in other labor markets where there exists close substitutes to the treated population. In
other words, there exist “non-treated” labor markets that, due to their (geographic or techno-
logical) proximity to the treated labor market, will also be affected by the policy in equilibrium.
We show here how the existence of other labor markets will affect market externalities. First,
we show how (and discuss why) equilibrium labor market conditions in other markets will be
affected. Then, we discuss how the existence of other markets affect the magnitude of market
externalities in the treated market.
How are other labor markets affected by a change in UI policy in one labor market? We
focus again on a two group model, but now group a and group b are assumed to be in two dif-
ferent labor markets. This means that firms can perfectly discriminate between the two groups
of workers when they open vacancies. In practice, there will be vacancies va to which only
workers of group a will apply and vacancies vb to which only workers of group b will apply. The
ability of firms to direct their search by tailoring the characteristics of vacancies to each group
of workers means that there will be in effect two labor markets with two labor market tightness
in equilibrium.
Firms’ profits are now equal to:
pi = φ
(
p · na, (1− p) · nb
)
− p · na · wa − (1− p) · nb · wb − r · ψ ·
{
p · na
q(θa)
+
(1− p) · nb
q(θb)
}
(23)
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For the firm, the optimal choice of vacancies to open for group a and group b is equivalent to the
optimal choice of na and nb, as va vacancies translate into na/q(θa) jobs for workers of group a
(and vb vacancies translate into nb/q(θb) jobs for workers of group b). The optimal labor demand
of firms for workers of group a, nda, and for workers of group b, n
d
b , is then implictely defined by
the two following first-order conditions:
∂φ
∂na
=
{
wa +
rψ
q(θa)
}
(24)
∂φ
∂nb
=
{
wb +
rψ
q(θb)
}
(25)
When technology is such that the marginal product of labor for group a (resp. group b) depends
on the level of employment of workers of group b (resp. group a), nda (resp. n
d
b) will be a function
of nb (resp. of na). Equilibrium conditions in the two labor markets can therefore be written
as: nda(wa, θa, nb) = n
s
a(θa, Ba) and n
d
b(wb, θb, na) = n
s
b(θb, Bb). In particular, if na and nb are
substitutes and there are diminishing returns to both na and nb, then
∂2φ
∂nb∂na
will be negative.
This means that, when the employment of workers of group a decreases (say, as a result of the
REBP), the marginal product of workers of group b, ∂φ∂nb , will increase. Firms will respond by
posting more vacancies vb. This will in turn increase labor market tightness θb, bringing up the
cost of opening vacancies in the market for group b workers, and decrease the productivity of
group b workers, until condition (25) is met again. A decrease in the employment of workers of
group a is therefore met by an increase in the employment of workers of group b, when workers
are substitutes. The larger the elasticity of substitution σ between group a and group b workers,
the larger this substitution effect.
A change in UI benefits Ba for workers of group a in one given market can therefore create
market externalities on workers of group b, who are in a separate labor market. These market
externalities are given by:
dhb
dBa
=
d(ebf(θb))
dBa
= ebf
′(θb)
dθb
dBa
(26)
where the equilibrium adjustment in tightness dθbdBa determines the size of market externality. To
calculate dθbdBa , we implicitly differentiate the system of equilibrium conditions for the two market
“prices”, θa and θb, with respect to Ba, using the fact that n
d
a and n
d
b are implicitly given by
equations (24) and (25). Note that supply of and demand for type b workers does not directly
depend on Ba but only indirectly through changes in θa and θb. In contrast, type a workers are
also directly affected by changes in Ba: labor demand is affected through the wage effect and
labor supply through the effect on search effort.
Implicitly differentiating this system yields:
∂θb
∂Ba
=
pφba
[
−∂nsa∂θa ∂wa∂Ba −
∂nsa
∂Ba
q′(θa)
q2(θa)
rψ
]
∆
(27)
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where ∆ =
[
φaap
∂nsa
∂θa
+ q
′(θa)
q2(θa)
rψ
] [
φbb(1− p)∂n
s
b
∂θb
+ q
′(θb)
q2(θb)
rψ
]
− φ2ab(1 − p)p
∂nsb
∂θb
p∂n
s
a
∂θa
> 0, since
φaaφbb − φ2ab > 0.
A few points are important to note about equations (26) and (27). First, the existence of mar-
ket externalities across labor markets is entirely driven by the substitution effect. This can be
easily seen from the right-hand-side of equation (27), which is proportional to the cross-derivative
of the production function. When φab = 0, the marginal product of type b is independent of
type a employment, an increase in Ba leaves labor market tightness for market b unchanged,
and group b is entirely unaffected by the increase in Ba.
24 In contrast, when φab < 0, so that the
two types of workers are substitutes, a larger Ba increases θb. There are two reasons. First, a
higher Ba may trigger an increase in wa, so that type a workers will be more expensive. Second,
a higher Ba lowers search effort of type a workers and vacancies become relatively easier to fill
with type b workers than type a workers. Firms will shift their labor demand towards type b and
equilibrium tightness in the market for workers of group b will go up. The higher the elasticity of
substitution, the larger (in absolute value) is φab and therefore the larger the market externality
on the non-treated labor market.
In terms of empirical identification, the existence of market externalities across labor markets
through substitution effects means that one needs to be very cautious when choosing the control
labor markets for the analysis. The control labor markets must be chosen so as to provide a
good counterfactual for what would have happened in the treated labor market in the absence
of REBP. At the same time, they must not offer substitution opportunities from the treated
labor market.
The second point worth noting is that market externalities on workers of group b, who are
now in a separate labor market, are different from market externalities in the treated labor mar-
ket (workers of group a), contrary to the case where matching was random and the two groups
of workers were in the same labor market. This means that in practice, the effect of REBP on
the job finding probability of non-treated workers who are not in the same labor market cannot
directly identify the market externalities of interest in the treated labor market.
Equation (27) shows that when there are multiple markets, one of them being treated and
others not being treated, there will be market externalities in non-treated markets but these
externalities cannot directly identify market externalities in the treated market. What can we
say then about market externalities in the treated market in this case? How does the existence of
substitution opportunities across labor markets affect market externalities in the treated market?
Recall from equation (9) that market externalities within the treated market depend on the
impact of the increase in Ba on tightness in the treated market. This can be inferred from
24Note again that, with a linear technology, we have φab = 0, and we should see no spillover effects across labor
markets in that case.
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implicit differentiation θa with respect to Ba using the two above equilibrium equations. This
yields:
∂θa
∂B
= p
−
[
φaa
∂nsa
∂B − ∂wa∂B
] [
φbb(1− p)∂n
s
b
∂θb
+ q
′(θb)
q2(θb)
rψ
]
+ (1− p)φ2ba ∂n
s
a
∂B
∂nsb
∂θb
∆
(28)
It is straightforward to verify that equation (28) reduces to (10) when we set p = 1.25 In the ab-
sence of any factors that could substitute for the treated workers, the results from the one-group
equilibrium apply. In contrast, when there are many substitution possibilities and the share of
the treated market in the aggregate economy is tiny (p goes to zero), the externality on the
treated market gets negligible.26 In other words, when the treated market gets small relative to
the aggregate economy, variations in labor market tightness in the treated market in response
to a change in UI benefits– and hence market externalities of UI benefits– become negligible.
The existence of substitution opportunities across labor markets therefore bears important
consequences for the interpretation of quasi-experimental results on externalities using variations
in unemployment benefits. When the experiment / policy variation is such that the treated
population of workers represent a relatively small labor market and there exists non-treated
labor markets that offer available substitutes for the treated workers, market externalities in
the treated labor market will be relatively small. And estimated equilibrium adjustments in
labor market tightness in such a context should be interpreted as a clear lower bound on the
equilibrium adjustments in labor market tightness that would occur if the whole population of
workers were to be treated.
A.4 Endogenous layoffs
The separation rate λ as been assumed exogenous. But in practice λ might be endogenous to UI
benefits (λ = λ(B)) and there is indeed evidence that the separation rate increased for eligible
workers during the REBP period (Winter-Ebmer [1996]), implying that ∂λa/∂(Ba) > 0. How
will the response of the separation rate to UI benefits affect market externalities of UI? From the
definition of labor supply given in equation 6, ns = ef(θ)λ+ef(θ) , which follows from the equality of
flows in and out of unemployment in the steady-state, it appears clearly that an increase in the
separation rate λ will shift labor supply downwards everything else equal. For a given search
effort level, and for a given labor market tightness, an increase in the separation rate means
that the stock of unemployed will be larger in the steady state and therefore the probability of
finding a job (ns) will be lower. An increase in the separation rate is equivalent to a downward
shift in labor supply and its effect on labor supply is comparable to that of a decrease in search
effort. If both search effort and the separation rate are responsive to UI benefits, the effect of a
25To see this, notice that the first order condition (φa(n
d
a, n
d
b)−wa(B)−rψ/q(θa) = 0 imply the partial derivative
∂nda/∂wa = 1/φaa and ∂n
d
a/∂θa = −(q′(θa)/q2(θa)) · (rψ/φaa). Similarly, for group b.
26This assumes that type-a workers are not essential for production, φaa(0, n
d
b) > −∞. In that case, as p goes
to zero, the numerator of equation (28) goes to zero, while the denominator stays positive.)
49
change in benefit of workers of group a on labor supply of group a is the sum of a search effort
effect (e′a · λa) and of a separation rate effect (ea · λ′a):
∂nsa
∂Ba
=
[e′a · λa − ea · λ′a]f(θ)
(λa + eaf(θ))2
In the context of REBP, because the separation rate effect ea · λ′a > 0 is significantly positive,
the downward shift in labor supply of treated workers will be even stronger than if only search
effort had reacted to the policy.
But an increase in the separation rate λ also increases recruiting costs of firms. As new jobs
have a higher probability of being terminated, the net present value of a job decreases. This will
create a downward shift of nd that can easily be seen in equation (7) which implicitly determines
labor demand of firms nd as a decreasing function of the layoff rate: ∂nd/∂λ ≤ 0. So the overall
effect on labor market tightness of a change in benefits for workers of group a when layoffs are
endogenous is:
dθ
dBa
= p
∂nda
∂wa
∂wa
∂Ba
+ ∂n
d
a
∂λa
∂λa
∂Ba
− ∂nsa∂Ba
∂ns
∂θ − ∂n
d
∂θ
(29)
where ∂n
d
a
∂λa
∂λa
∂Ba
is the layoff rate effect on labor demand. The overall effect of endogenous layoffs
on equilibrium adjustments in labor market tightness dθdBa is therefore ambiguous, as can be
seen by comparing equation (29) to equation (17). The presence of endogenous layoffs creates a
negative layoff rate effect on labor demand ( ∂n
d
a
∂λa
∂λa
∂Ba
≤ 0), which will tend to reduce labor mar-
ket tightness, but it also increases the magnitude of the shift in labor supply ∂n
s
a
∂Ba
as discussed
earlier, which will tend to increase labor market tightness. The relative magnitude of these two
effects will therefore determine if endogenous layoffs deepens or attenuates the effect of UI on
equilibrium labor market tightness.
B Defining labor markets using vacancy data
Identifying which workers are competing for the same vacancies workers satisfying the REBP-
eligibility requirements is critical to determine and define the relevant labor markets that are
affected by externalities of the REBP program. As explained in section A.2, when treated and
non-treated workers are in the same labor market, i.e. competing for the same vacancies, the
effect of the program on non-treated workers can identify equilibrium labor market tightness in
the labor market. When treated and non-treated workers are competing for different vacancies,
there are in practice two search markets for labor, and the effect of the program on non-treated
workers cannot directly identify equilibrium adjustments in the treated market.
To determine which workers are competing for the same vacancies as REBP eligible workers,
we use detailed micro data on the universe of job vacancies posted in public employment agencies
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available for the period 1994-1998. (Vacancies posted in public employment agencies represent
30% to 40% of all posted vacancies). This data set has two important features. First, the data
records for each vacancy all the detailed information about the characteristics of the vacancy.
This includes the firm identifier of the firm posting the vacancy, the date (in month) at which
the vacancy is opened and the date at which it is closed, the reason for closing the vacancy (the
vacancy has been filled, search has been abandoned, etc.), the identifier of the public employ-
ment service where the vacancy is posted, the industry and job classifications of the job, details
on the duration and type of the contract (full-time,/part-time tenured/non-tenured, seasonal
job, etc.), the age requirement if any, the education requirement if any, the gender requirement
if any, and the posted wage or range of wage if any. Second, the data contains the personal
identifier of the person who filled the vacancy if the vacancy is filled. This personal identifier
enables us to match this vacancy data to the ASSD and determine the characteristics and REBP
eligibility status of the person filling the vacancy.
Our strategy consists in using all the information that we have on each vacancy, and esti-
mate how well the characteristics of each vacancy predicts the REBP eligibility status of the
worker who fills the vacancy. If there is perfect discrimination in vacancies between eligible and
non-eligible workers, then eligible and non-eligible workers will be competing for two different
sets of vacancies and will effectively be in two different labor markets from a search-theoretic
perspective. Empirically, this means that characteristics of vacancies for eligible and non-eligible
workers are different, and therefore characteristics of vacancies should predict very well whether
the individual filling the vacancy is eligible to REBP or not. To the contrary, if eligible and
non-eligible workers are in the same job-search market, they will compete for the same vacancies.
When opening a vacancy in this market, and conditional on search effort of eligible and non-
eligible workers, a firm will be randomly matched to an eligible or to a non-eligible worker. In
other words, conditional on search effort of eligible and non-eligible workers, matching is random
across eligible and non-eligible workers and vacancies in this market will be filled (randomly) by
eligible or non-eligible workers. In this case, the characteristics of a vacancy will have very little
predictive power on the eligibility status of the worker who fills it.
To implement this strategy, we take all vacancies opened by firms located in REBP regions
that ended up being filled (by REBP eligible or non-eligible male workers) during 1994 to 1998.
(Before this period, the quality of the data is too weak and thus cannot be used for our analysis.)
We estimate the following latent variable model:
Y ∗i = X
′
iβ + i
Yi =
{
0 if Y ∗i < 0
1 if Y ∗i ≥ 0
where Yi is a dummy variable indicating whether the worker filling vacancy i is eligible to REBP
or not, and Xi is a vector of all the characteristics of vacancy i. These characteristics are the
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two-digit industry code of the firm opening the vacancy, the two-digit occupation code of the
job, the duration of the contract (temporary contract, unlimited contract, seasonal job, holiday
work, etc.), whether the job is full-time, part-time or flexible hours, whether the job hours are
negotiable or not, whether the job implies shift work, whether it implies night or extra hours
work, whether the job is an apprenticeship, the size of the firm (in 5 categories), the age re-
quired for the job if any, and the level of education required for the job (in 17 categories) if any.
We estimate this model using a logit. We run the model separately for various categories of
non-eligible workers (35 to 40 years old workers, 40 to 45 years old workers, 45 to 50 years old
workers, and 50-54 years old non-eligible workers) in order to compare each of these categories
of workers to REBP eligible workers. For each of the categories of non-eligible workers, we then
analyze the predictive power of the model using various goodness-of-fit measures.
In figure 2 panel A, we start by plotting the p-value of two standard goodness-of-fit tests for
the logit model, the Pearson’s χ2 goodness of fit test and the Hosmer-Lemeshow χ2 goodness
of fit test, for different categories of non-eligible workers. A low p-value for the test indicates
a poor fit of the data. Both tests suggest that the model fits the data very well for comparing
eligible workers to non-eligible workers aged 35 to 40, but tend to perform more and more poorly
as we use non-eligible workers that are older. When comparing eligible workers to non-eligible
workers aged 50 to 54, the p-value is very close to zero, and the goodness-of-fit of the model is
extremely poor. This suggests that the predictive power of vacancy characteristics on eligibility
is very good when comparing workers that are below 50 to eligible workers, but very low when
comparing eligible and non-eligible workers aged 50 to 54. In other words, workers age below 50
seem to fill vacancies that have characteristics that are very different from the vacancies filled
by eligible workers. But eligible and non-eligible workers above 50 seem to fill vacancies that
have very similar characteristics. This suggests that workers aged below 50 are likely to be in
a different job search market than eligible workers, but non-eligible workers aged 50 to 54 are
very likely to compete for the same vacancies as eligible workers.
In panel B of figure 2, we plot the fraction of observations that are incorrectly predicted
by the model (i.e. the predicted eligibility status to REBP is different from the true eligibility
status of the worker filling the vacancy) for all categories of non-eligible workers. The fraction
of misclassified observations is less than 7.5% for the model comparing eligible workers to non-
eligible workers aged 30 to 40, but increases up to more than 25% for the model comparing
eligible workers to non-eligible workers aged 50 to to 54. We also plot the fraction of type I
errors, i.e. the fraction of true non-eligible workers that are predicted as being eligible to REBP
by the model. Type I errors are particularly relevant in our context. They provide information
about how likely it is that a non-eligible worker is competing for a vacancy that has been “tai-
lored” to eligible workers based on its characteristics. In this sense, type I errors provide direct
information about the intensity of the competition that eligible workers receive from various
groups of non-eligible workers when a vacancy is opened in “their” search market. The figure
indicates that type I errors seem to be particularly severe when comparing eligible workers to
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non-eligible workers aged 50 to 54. Because classification is sensitive to the relative sizes of
each component group, and always favors classification into the larger group, the classification
error measures of panel B should still be interpreted with caution. We therefore tend to prefer
goodness-of-fit measures presented in panel A.
These results help inform our identification strategy and choose the proper groups of non-
eligible workers to identify the presence of externalities. The results indicate that it is much more
likely for non-eligible workers aged 50 and over to compete for the same vacancies as eligible
workers than for non-eligible workers aged below 50. This means that non-eligible workers aged
50 and above are likely to be in the same job-search market as eligible workers, while non-eligible
workers aged below 50 tend to compete for different vacancies and are therefore in a different
job-search market. This means that the effect of REBP on job-finding probabilities of eligible
workers aged 50 and above is more likely to identify variations in labor market tightness in the
job-search market of REBP-treated workers. As explained in section A.2, these variations in
labor market tightness in the job-search market of REBP-treated workers capture both the rat
race effect and the wage effect of UI, and are the relevant variations to consider to identify the
equilibrium effect of variations in UI in a given labor market.
Non-eligible workers below 50 years old, to the contrary, seem to be competing for different
vacancies than workers eligible to REBP. This means that they are more likely to operate in a
different search market than workers eligible to REBP. The effect of REBP on their job finding
probability is therefore more likely to identify externalities across search markets. In section
A.3, we have shown that such externalities stem from substitution effects, and cannot directly
identify the effect of REBP on the labor market tightness in the search market of treated workers.
Overall, the vacancy data is useful to determine the scope of the different job search mar-
kets. This analysis indicates that the externalities that we may find on non-eligible workers
may be very different in nature and in magnitude across different groups of non-eligible workers.
Non-eligible workers aged 50+ are more likely to experience larger externalities stemming from
equilibrium adjustments in labor market tightness in the search market of workers eligible to
REBP. Non-eligible workers that are younger than 50 are more likely to experience externalities
stemming from substitution effects across search markets.
C Additional tables and figures
Standard errors To correct for the presence of common random effects, we cluster standard
errors at the region-year level. We have checked sensitivity of inference in three ways. First, we
allow for clustering by markets defined as county-by-industry-by-education cells (see appendix
C, table 6). Results indicate that standard errors are robust to clustering by markets. Second,
clustering by market is fully flexible in terms of clustering in time but assumes no correlation
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Table 6: Sensitivity of Baseline Results to Inference Assumptions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unemployment Non-employment Spell Spell
duration duration > 100 wks > 26 wks
β0 43.37 29.17 0.240*** 0.237***
Baseline cluster (5.069)*** (5.444)*** (0.0293)*** (0.0240)***
Market cluster (4.581)*** (4.867)*** (0.0247)*** (0.0278)***
Spatial HAC (4.319)*** (4.785)*** (0.0230)*** (0.0250)***
Permutation (1.143)*** (0.930)*** (0.0077)*** (0.0099)***
γ0 -3.740 -2.327 -0.0130 -0.0165
Baseline cluster (0.758)*** (0.629)*** (0.00311)*** (0.00660)**
Market cluster (0.798)*** (1.004)** (0.00231)*** (0.00585)***
Spatial HAC (0.862)*** (1.012)** (0.00287)*** (0.00889)*
Permutation (1.528)** (1.124)** (0.00519)** (0.00880)*
N 262344 232135 262344 262344
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.010. This table reports the main result from Table 2. Numbers in parentheses
display standard errors. Baseline standard errors allow for clustering at the region * year level. Market cluster
standard errors allow for clustering at the level of the market, i.e. a county × education × industry cell – this is
the classification we use to detect market externalities in Table 5 of the paper. Spatial HAC standard errors allow
for any correlation in errors in a circle of 33 kilometers around a job seeker’s location, and zero correlation beyond
that. Spatial HAC standard errors also allow for full correlation between spells starting in the same quarter, one
half correlation between spells that start one quarter apart, and no correlation beyond. Permutation standard
errors are based on 235 placebo estimates of simulations of the REBP program during non-REBP time periods.
Source: Own calculations, based on ASSD.
across markets or space. Conley [1999] proposes a more flexible approach to inference that allows
for arbitrary tempo-spatial dependence in shocks within a distance and an autocorrelation cutoff,
so-called spatial HAC standard errors. We report results that use a distance cutoff of 33 km
– the median commuting distance for job seekers in Austria – and an autocorrelation cutoff of
two quarters. Spatial HAC standard errors are similar to our baseline standard errors. Third,
both clustering on market and spatial HAC standard errors rely on assumptions regarding the
tempo-spatial dependence of standard errors. Permutation is a way to assess sensitivity to these
assumptions. Permutation works as follows: we first construct a set of 235 placebo REBP
estimates on non-REBP periods and then conduct inference using the distribution of placebo
REBP effects. Permutation based standard errors for the market externality are somewhat
larger than baseline standard errors, and substantially smaller for the effect of REBP on the
eligible. But our inference remains robust to adopting this permutation procedure.27
27Kline and Moretti [2014] have adopted the spatial HAC approach in their analysis of the Tennesess Valley
Authority. Chetty et al. [2014] use permutation to study sensitivity of inference in active savings decisions in a
regression discontinuity design. Lalive et al. [2013] use permutation to test sensitivity of disabled employment to
financial incentives in a threshold design.
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Table 7: Sensitivity analysis to sample restrictions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Unemployment duration Non-empl. Spell Spell
duration >100 wks >26 wks
A. Men, 46 to 59, excluding steel sector
β0 50.20
∗∗∗ 44.84∗∗∗ 43.82∗∗∗ 33.60∗∗∗ 0.254∗∗∗ 0.222∗∗∗
(3.607) (3.300) (3.210) (5.165) (0.0192) (0.0155)
γ0 -2.680
∗∗∗ -2.133∗∗∗ -3.222∗∗∗ -2.514∗∗∗ -0.00912∗∗∗ -0.0139∗∗
(0.782) (0.657) (0.608) (0.527) (0.00240) (0.00545)
N 378556 369477 369477 304664 369477 369477
B. Men and women, 46 to 54, excluding steel sector
β0 55.93
∗∗∗ 52.28∗∗∗ 51.80∗∗∗ 40.59∗∗∗ 0.297∗∗∗ 0.238∗∗∗
(3.549) (3.472) (3.319) (5.147) (0.0192) (0.0163)
γ0 -2.241
∗∗∗ -1.307∗∗ -3.217∗∗∗ -1.892∗∗∗ -0.0103∗∗∗ -0.0106∗∗
(0.781) (0.648) (0.682) (0.608) (0.00297) (0.00522)
N 359901 351433 351433 296768 351433 351433
C. Men, 46 to 54, including steel sector
β0 47.33
∗∗∗ 43.82∗∗∗ 43.85∗∗∗ 30.58∗∗∗ 0.242∗∗∗ 0.238∗∗∗
(5.534) (5.108) (5.045) (5.603) (0.0290) (0.0237)
γ0 -2.248
∗∗∗ -1.809∗∗ -3.581∗∗∗ -2.228∗∗∗ -0.0119∗∗∗ -0.0158∗∗
(0.825) (0.730) (0.785) (0.632) (0.00304) (0.00700)
N 284099 278021 278021 245621 278021 278021
Educ., industry,
citizenship, × × × × ×
marital status
Region-specific × × × ×
trends
Notes: S.e. clustered at the year×region level in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.010.
All duration outcomes are expressed in weeks. The table presents estimates of the model presented in equation (3) where
we explore the sensitivity of our baseline results to various sample restrictions. β0 identifies the effect of REBP on eligible
unemployed, while γ0 identifies spillovers of REBP on non-eligible unemployed in REBP counties. In column (1), we estimate
this model without any other controls. In column (2) we add a vector of controls X which includes education, 15 industry
codes, family status, citizenship and tenure in previous job. In column (3) to (6) we add controls for preexisting trends by
region. Column (5) uses as an outcome the duration of total non-employment (conditional on finding employment at the
end of the unemployment spell). Columns (6) and (7) use as an outcome the probability of experiencing unemployment
spells longer than 100 weeks and 26 weeks respectively. In panel A, the estimation sample includes all men age 46 to 59. In
panel B, the sample includes all men and women age 46 to 54. In panel C, the sample is the same as our baseline sample
but also includes workers who ever worked in the steel sector.
Table 8: Robustness to REBP-counties-specific shocks: Externalities on non-eligible
aged 50 to 54 using unemployed aged 30 to 39 in REBP counties as a control
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Unemployment Non-empl. Spell
duration duration >26 wks
β0 54.32*** 50.81*** 30.30*** 30.29*** 0.312*** 0.275***
(7.480) (6.784) (7.639) (7.192) (0.0432) (0.0362)
γ0 (externality) -7.878** -6.466* -7.643*** -6.347** -0.0742*** -0.0554**
(3.880) (3.437) (2.156) (2.461) (0.0222) (0.0213)
Educ., marital status,
industry, citizenship × × ×
N 182689 180098 170388 168163 182689 180098
Notes: S.e. clustered at the year×county level in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010.
All duration outcomes are expressed in weeks. We use the same strategy as in table 2 but we use men aged 30 to
39 in REBP counties as a control instead of men 50 to 54 in non-REBP counties. We run on a sample restricted
to unemployed aged 30 to 39 and 50 to 54 a diff-in-diff specification equivalent to equation (3) where we replace
M by A = 1[Age > 50]. This specification enables us to fully control for shocks to the labor markets of REBP
counties contemporaneous to REBP.
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Table 9: Externalities on non-eligible unemployed by initial level of labor mar-
ket tightness
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unemployment Non-empl. Spell Spell
REBP effect on non-treated duration duration >100 wks >26 wks
All non-eligible
γHigh θ0 ( θ ≥ P50) 0.728 -1.650 0.00877 -0.0208
(1.411) (1.088) (0.00571) (0.0125)
γLow θ0 (θ < P50 ) -2.250*** -1.809** -0.00457* -0.00936
(0.726) (0.733) (0.00255) (0.00657)
F-Test γLow θ0 = γ
High θ
0 [0.0635] [0.910] [0.0530] [0.422]
N 262109 231940 262109 262109
Non-eligible 50+
γHigh θ0 ( θ ≥ P50) -1.317 -2.788 0.00878 -0.0309
(4.073) (2.745) (0.0181) (0.0204)
γLow θ0 (θ < P50 ) -7.539*** -5.999** -0.0167** -0.0312*
(2.334) (2.407) (0.00801) (0.0180)
F-Test γLow θ0 = γ
High θ
0 [0.0530] [0.320] [0.114] [0.992]
N 122174 102598 122174 122174
Educ., marital status,
industry, citizenship × × × ×
Notes: S.e. clustered at the year×region level in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010.
Sample restricted to male workers working in non-steel related sectors. All duration outcomes are expressed in weeks.
The table presents estimates of the effects of REBP on non-eligible workers broken down by the initial level of la-
bor market tightness in county×industry×education cells. Initial labor market tightness is obtained by dividing
the average monthly number of vacancies posted in 1990 (the first year for which we have some vacancy infor-
mation by county) in each county×industry×education cell, by the average monthly number of unemployed in the
same county×industry×education cell. γHigh θ0 identifies externalities of REBP on non-treated workers in REBP
county×industry×education cells where labor market tightness was above the median level of tightness in 1990. γLow θ0
identifies externalities of REBP on non-treated workers in REBP county×industry×education cells where labor market
tightness was below the median level of tightness in 1990.
D Wages
D.1 Effect of REBP on reemployment wages
As highlighted in section 2 and explained formally in appendix section A, one of the key require-
ment for externalities to be positive on non-eligible workers is that wages do not react much to
outside options of workers. Here, we investigate explicitly this question by looking at the effect
of REBP on reemployment wages and other characteristics of jobs at reemployment.28
The identification of the effect of REBP on wages is very different from our previous market
externality analysis, as we now wish to compare eligible workers to non-eligible workers (rather
than non-eligible in treated and non treated markets). The identification of the effect of REBP
on wages is difficult for at least three reasons. First, REBP treatment is correlated with longer
unemployment duration, which may directly affect wages through duration dependence effects.
If reemployment wages depend on the duration of the unemployment spell w = w(D,B) (because
of human capital depreciation, or discrimination from the employers), then the effect of a change
in benefits B on reemployment wage can be decomposed into two effects:
dw
dB
=
∂w
∂D
· ∂D
∂B︸ ︷︷ ︸
Duration effect
+
Reservation wage effect︷︸︸︷
∂w
∂B
If reemployment wages decline over the duration of a spell ( ∂w∂D < 0), the total effect of an
increase in benefits on reemployment wages might be zero or even negative even though the
reservation wage effect is positive.
The second issue is that REBP treatment affects the probability of entering into unemploy-
ment and REBP recipients may therefore be selected along unobserved characteristics that are
correlated with wages. Treatment is also correlated with the probability of ever reentering the
labor force, which creates additional selection issues when looking at reemployment wages.
The third issue is that REBP affects labor market tightness, which will in turn affect the
bargaining power of workers. It is thus difficult to separate what is the pure reservation wage
effect from other equilibrium effects affecting wages.
We try to address these issues in the following analysis, but we want to stress that our
analysis remains tentative. To deal with the first issue, we follow the methodology of Schmieder
et al. [2012a] and estimate the effect of variations in benefits on reemployment wages conditional
on unemployment duration. We do this first in the diff-in-diff setting of equation 3, and then in
a RD setting taking advantage of the age eligibility discontinuity at 50 and experience eligibility
discontinuity at 15 years. Note that in both cases, the identifying assumption requires that there
is no correlation between unobserved heterogeneity and unemployment benefits conditional on
unemployment duration which is a much stronger assumption than in the standard diff-in-diff
or RD assumptions where we only need that the correlation between unobserved heterogeneity
28Note that Lalive [2007] discusses the effects of benefit extension programs on re-employment wages without
conditioning on elapsed unemployment duration.
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and unemployment benefits is zero.
We plot in appendix figure 6 post-unemployment wages conditional on the duration of the
unemployment spell in REBP and non-REBP counties for eligible workers (aged 50 to 54 with
more than 15 years of experience). The difference between REBP and non-REBP counties at
each duration point in panel B (when REBP was in place) compared to the same difference in
panel A (when REBP was not in place) gives us a diff-in-diff estimate of the effect of REBP on
reemployment wages conditional on spell duration. This evidence suggests that there was no
effect of REBP on reemployment wages.
We formally assess this result in appendix table 10 by running a simple diff-in-diff model
where we compare workers eligible to REBP (treatment) to non-eligible workers (control). Each
panel uses a different control group. In panel A, we use workers aged 50 to 54 with more than 15
years of experience but residing in non-REBP regions. In panel B we use workers aged 50 to 54
residing in REBP regions but with less than 15 years of experience. In panel C we use workers
aged 46 to 49 with more than 15 years of experience and residing in REBP regions. In column
(1), we estimate the model without further controls. In column (2) we add a vector of controls
including education, 15 industry codes, family status, citizenship and tenure in previous job.
These specifications tend to deliver a negative effect of REBP on reemployment wages. This
negative effect may well be driven by selection into unemployment. We know from table 3 that
REBP has affected the inflow rate into unemployment of eligible workers. This means that the
selection of eligible workers may be different during REBP. We try to control for this using
pre-employment wages. In column (3) we add a rich set of pre-unemployment wage dummies
to control for potential differential self-selection into unemployment due to REBP. As explained
above, the negative effect on reemployment wages found in column (1) and (2) can also be due
to duration dependence effects. In column (4) we allow for an effect of longer unemployment
spells during on reemployment wages (because of skill depreciation, employer discrimination,
etc.). Following the methodology of Schmieder et al. [2012a], we condition on the duration of
unemployment using a rich set of dummies for the duration of unemployment prior to finding a
new job. In this preferred specification of column (4), irrespective of the control group we are
using, we always find no significant effect of REBP on reemployment wages.
To complement our diff-in-diff approach, we also focus on the age eligibility discontinuity at
50 in REBP counties and estimate RD effects of the REBP extensions controlling for the effect
of duration on reemployment wages by adding a rich set of dummies for the duration of the spell
prior to finding the job.
E[Y |A = a] =
p¯∑
p=0
[γp(a− k)p + νp(a− k)p · 1[A ≥ k]] +
T∑
t=0
1[D = t] (30)
where Y is real reemployment wage, A is age at the beginning of the unemployment spell, k = 50
is the age eligibility threshold, and D is the duration of the unemployment spell prior to finding
the new job. We use a third-order polynomial specification. Results are displayed in appendix
figure 7, where we have estimated this model for six periods to look at the dynamics of the wage
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response. Before REBP, we can detect no sign of discontinuity at age 50 in reemployment wages.
But interestingly, we can detect a small discontinuity at the beginning of REBP (1988-1990).
This discontinuity increases over time and is the largest in 1991-1993, at the peak of REBP.
The implied RD estimate of the elasticity of wages with respect to UI benefits is .14 (.04). This
discontinuity then decreases and disappears when REBP is over. This suggests that wages are
relatively rigid in the short run, but that in the longer run, wages might adjust to variations
in outside options of workers. Note, however, that the McCrary test rejects continuity of the
probability density function of the assignment variable (age) at the cutoff (50 years) during
REBP. This implies that the wage effects could also partly be driven by selection (sorting) at
the 50 years age cut-off.
We finally exploit the experience eligibility discontinuity in REBP counties using the same
methodology. Results are displayed in appendix figure 9. The figure displays for REBP regions
the relationship between experience in the past 25 years at the beginning of unemployment spell
and reemployment wages for workers aged 50 to 54. We use the discontinuity created by the
fact that workers with more than 15 years of experience are eligible for REBP extensions while
workers with less than 15 years are not eligible. The graph shows the average reemployment
wage for each bin of 6 months of past experience for all non REBP years and for all REBP
years. We also estimate a model of the form: E[Y |E = e] = ∑p¯p=0 γp(a−k)p+νp(a−k)p ·1[E ≥
k] +
∑T
t=0 1[D = t], where Y is real reemployment wage, E is experience at the beginning of
the unemployment spell, k = 15 is the experience eligibility threshold, and D is the duration of
the unemployment spell prior to finding the new job. The graph plots the predicted values of
this regression for all non REBP years and for all REBP years using a 3rd order polynomial for
the regressions. Here, we find no evidence of an effect of REBP on reemployment wages. Note
again however that McCrary tests rejects continuity in the probability density function of the
assignment variable (experience) at the cutoff (15 years) during REBP.
Overall, this evidence, although tentative, suggests that wages of eligible workers did not
strongly respond to REBP, which is in line with the market externalities that we find. Yet, we
cannot exclude that these results are confounded by selection, nor can we exclude that wages
would have adjusted in the very long run.
D.2 Implications of these results for the wage setting process
What can we learn on the wage setting process from this empirical evidence? Is this evidence,
combined with other available evidence, compatible with Nash bargaining?
Note that union membership is not extremely high in Austria, and the wage setting process
is less centralized and rigid than in most continental European countries. Austria has (formally)
a decentralized system of wage negotiations. 400 collective agreements determine a minimum
wage in the particular sector/occupation where the contract applies and the wage growth for
effective wages, leaving some room for individual bargaining.
In a standard DMP model with Nash bargaining, the wage w is a weighted average of the
productivity of the worker Π (which determines the reservation price of the employer) and of the
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value of remaining unemployed z (which determines the reservation price of the unemployed):
w = βΠ + (1− β)z
The weight β corresponds to the bargaining power of the unemployed. Therefore dwdΠ = β and
dw
dz = 1 − β. In other words, the bargaining power of the workers could be identified by the
variation of wages to a change in Π or z. The main problem is that we never observe p nor
z = z(B,X), which depends not only on unemployment benefits B but also on many other
different things such as the disutility of work, etc. The Nash bargaining model is therefore
fundamentally non-identifiable. Are there nevertheless credible values of Π, z and β that would
rationalize the empirical evidence presented here? First, all the evidence in the macro literature
(see, for instance, Shimer [2005] and Hagedorn and Manovskii [2008]) suggests that wages do not
react much to productivity shocks, so that dwdΠ is likely to be small. This, implies that β is small.
But if β is small, then wages should react a lot to variations in the outside options of workers,
i.e. the value of remaining unemployed: dwdz and εz =
dw
dz · zw should be large. Of course, we
never directly observe εz. We only observe the variation of wages to a change in unemployment
benefits dwdB · Bw = εz · ∂z∂B · Bz . Given that we found dwdB · Bw ≈ 0, it is difficult to believe that εz
is very large, unless ∂z∂B · Bz << 1. In other words, it is difficult to reconcile the small elasticity
of w w.r.t z and the small elasticity of w w.r.t p in the Nash bargaining model. The only
solution is to assume that Bz << 1 as in Hagedorn and Manovskii [2008]. But two pieces of
evidence argue against such an assumption. First, if we follow their preferred calibration for β,
our largest estimate of εz would imply
29 that B ≤ .05 · z which seems absurdly low. In other
words the value of remaining unemployed would be more than 20 times larger than the value of
the unemployment benefits received by an unemployed. Second, if Bz << 1, this in turn implies
that accounting profits of firms Π−w are small, so that even small increases in w have very large
effects on vacancy openings by firms, driving labor market tightness down. This means that
the “wage externality” would be very large, shocking labor demand down as in figure 5 panel
B. This would also mean that the externalities of large unemployment extension programs like
REBP would likely go in the opposite direction compared to our estimates. Overall, it seems
reasonable to think that the Nash bargaining model is maybe not the best way to describe the
data. A model of wage setting with some wage stickiness, at least in the short to medium run
seems more appropriate. Still, it does not mean that Nash bargaining is not appropriate to
describe the longer run. Indeed, the effects of REBP on wages seems to build up slightly over
time and with treatment intensity. In the very long run, wages may adjust more to B than what
we observe in the REBP experiment, suggesting that dwdz can be larger in the long run. This has
important implications for the design of UI policies.
29Assuming an additive specification z = B + f(X) so that ∂z
∂B
= 1.
Figure 6: Reemployment wages conditional on duration of unemployment spell in
REBP and non-REBP counties
A. Before and after REBP
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Notes: the figure plots post-unemployment wages conditional on the duration of the unemployment spell in REBP
and non-REBP counties for workers aged 50 to 54 with more than 15 years of experience in the past 25 years prior
to becoming unemployed. Following the methodology of Schmieder et al. [2012a], by conditioning on the duration
of unemployment, we control for the fact that REBP eligible workers experienced longer unemployment spells
during the REBP period, which may impact reemployment wages if the distribution of wages depend on time
spent unemployed (because of skill depreciation or discrimination from employers for instance). The difference
between REBP and non-REBP counties at each duration point in panel B (when REBP was in place) compared
to the same difference in panel A (when REBP was not in place) gives us a diff-in-diff estimate of the “reservation
wage” effect. This evidence suggests that there was no significant reservation wage effect of REBP.
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Table 10: Diff-in-diff estimates of the effects of REBP on wages
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log reemployment wage
A. Control: eligible workers 50-54 in non-REBP regions
REBP × eligible -0.0291** -0.0403** -0.0589*** -0.00895
(0.0133) (0.0153) (0.0183) (0.0123)
N 77743 76501 75594 76501
B. Control: non-eligible workers 50-54 in REBP regions
REBP × eligible -0.101 -0.0913 -0.0473 -0.0891
(0.0820) (0.0820) (0.0867) (0.0591)
N 23278 22996 22781 22996
C. Control: non-eligible workers 46-50 in REBP regions
REBP × eligible 0.00550 -0.0144 -0.0313 0.000967
(0.0228) (0.0286) (0.0240) (0.0242)
N 46701 46251 45826 46227
Educ., marital status,
industry, citizenship × × ×
Pre-unemployment
wage dummies ×
Set of dummies
for duration of U spell ×
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the year×region level. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010. The table
investigates the impact of REBP on real reemployment wages. The specification is a diff-in-diff where we compare
workers eligible to REBP (treatment) to non-eligible workers (control). Each panel uses a different control group.
In panel A, we use workers aged 50 to 54 with more than 15 years of experience but residing in non-REBP regions.
In panel B we use workers aged 50 to 54 residing in REBP regions but with less than 15 years of experience. In
panel C we use workers aged 46 to 50 with 15 years of experience and residing in REBP regions. Column (1)
runs a basic diff-in-diff specification using log reemployment wages as an outcome with no additional controls.
In column (2) we add a vector of controls including education, 15 industry codes, family status, citizenship and
tenure in previous job. In column (3) we add a rich set of pre-unemployment wage dummies to control for potential
differential self-selection into unemployment due to REBP. In column (4), following the methodology of Schmieder
et al. [2012a], we condition on the duration of unemployment using a rich set of dummies for the duration of
unemployment prior to finding a new job. This is in order to control for the fact that REBP eligible workers
experienced longer unemployment spells during the REBP period, which may impact reemployment wages if the
distribution of wages depend on time spent unemployed (because of skill depreciation or discrimination from
employers for instance).
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Figure 7: RD evidence on wage bargaining over time: relationship between age and reemployment wages in REBP counties
1981-1987 1988-1990 1991-1993
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Notes: the figure displays for REBP regions the relationship between age at the beginning of unemployment spell and reemployment wages for workers with more than 15
years of experience in the past 25 years prior to becoming unemployed. Workers aged 50 or more are eligible for REBP extensions while workers aged less than 50 are not
eligible. We follow the methodology of Schmieder et al. [2012a] and estimate RD effects of the extensions controlling for duration by adding a rich set of dummies for the
duration of the spell prior to finding the job. E[Y |A = a] = ∑p¯p=0 γp(a− k)p + νp(a− k)p · 1[A ≥ k] +∑Tt=0 1[D = t], where Y is real reemployment wage, A is age at the
beginning of the unemployment spell, k = 50 is the age eligibility threshold, and D is the duration of the unemployment spell prior to finding the new job. The graph plots
the predicted values of this regression for 6 periods: before REBP 1981-1987, at the beginning of REBP (1988-1990), at the peak of REBP (1991-1993), when REBP was
scaled down (1994-1997) and then for two periods after the end of REBP (1998-2005 and 2006-2009). All regressions use a 3rd order polynomial specification. Note that
for all periods, we ran a McCrary test, which ruled out the presence of a discontinuity in the probability density function of the assignment variable (age) at the cutoff (50
years), except for the 1991-1993 where a discontinuity can be detected.
Figure 8: Probability density function of age at the start of an unemployment
spell in REBP and non-REBP counties
A. Before REBP
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Figure 9: RD evidence on wages using experience cutoff: relationship between
experience and reemployment wages in REBP counties
Non-REBP period
Wage elasticity
RD estimate = -.01 (.04) REBP = OFF
8
9
10
11
Lo
g 
re
em
plo
ym
en
t w
ag
e 
(e
ur
o 
20
00
)
7.5 10 12.5 15 17.5 20 22.5
Experience
REBP period
Wage elasticity
RD estimate = -.07 (.05) REBP = ON
8
9
10
11
Lo
g 
re
em
plo
ym
en
t w
ag
e 
(e
ur
o 
20
00
)
7.5 10 12.5 15 17.5 20 22.5
Experience
Notes: the figure displays for REBP regions the relationship between experience in the past 25 years at the
beginning of unemployment spell and reemployment wages for workers aged 50 to 54. Workers with more than
15 years of experience are eligible for REBP extensions while workers with less than 15 years are not eligible.
We follow the methodology of Schmieder et al. [2012a] and estimate RD effects of the extensions controlling for
duration by adding a rich set of dummies for the duration of the spell prior to finding the job. E[Y |E = e] =∑p¯
p=0 γp(a− k)p + νp(a− k)p ·1[E ≥ k] +
∑T
t=0 1[D = t], where Y is real reemployment wage, E is experience at
the beginning of the unemployment spell, k = 15 is the experience eligibility threshold, and D is the duration of
the unemployment spell prior to finding the new job. The graph plots the predicted values of this regression for
all non REBP years and for all REBP years using a 3rd order polynomial for the regressions.
